This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

UC-NRLF
B 3 920 465

REESE LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
Received May 1884
Accessions No. 25472 Shelf No. ...



MODERN PHILOSOPHY,

BY JAMES MURDOCK, D. D.
AUTHOR OF MURDOCK'S MOSHEIM.

SECOND EDITION.

NEW-YORK: M. W. DODD.
HARTFORD: JOHN C. WELLS.
1844.

ENTERED according to Act of Congress, in the year 1842, by
JAMES MURDOCK,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Connecticut.

45472

B791
M8

PREFACE.

THIS work was commenced about a year ago, at the request of several gentlemen, chiefly clergymen, who said they could obtain no definite ideas of the modern German Philosophy. To meet the wants of these friends, and others in like circumstances, the author undertook to publish some short Essays in the Congregational Observer, edited by Messrs. Tyler & Porter of Hartford. Soon after the publication commenced, the editors proposed striking off a number of copies in the volume form; and also encouraged some enlargement and extension of the plan of the work. But before its completion, the Newspaper was discontinued; and the two last Chapters now first appear in print.—The piecemeal composition of the work will account for some want of uniformity in the style and manner of treating the subject; and the author's distance from the press, and the difficulty of Newspaper correction, must excuse several unfortunate errata.

The author here brings before the public no new *system* of philosophy, nor any attempted *improvements* of the science. Neither does he offer a *critique* upon the writings and speculations of others. He is not a philosopher; he has no favorite opinions to introduce and recommend; and he does not assume the office of a teacher of philosophical science. He comes forward as a mere *historian*, narrating the progress of speculative philosophy in modern times, es-

pecially among the Germans. And for this purpose, after a brief statement of the two principal modes of philosophizing, he endeavors to describe summarily but distinctly, all the more noted systems proposed by the metaphysical philosophers from the times of Des Cartes to the present day. In this survey, he endeavors to discriminate accurately between the different systems mentioned, to state clearly and concisely the fundamental principles of each system, its objects and aims, the estimation in which it was held, and the extent to which it has prevailed.

The principal authorities consulted in the twelve first chapters of the work, are *W. G. Tennemann's* Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. 1829: *T. A. Rixner's* Handbuch der Gesch. der Philos. ed. 1822: *W. T. Krug's* Encyclopadisch-Philosophisches Lexikon. ed. 1832–38: and the Algem. Deutsche Real-Encyclopadie. ed. 1824. In the remaining chapters, the authorities are generally stated in the work. While writing the four chapters on the Kantean Philosophy, the author had not the Critik der reinen Vernunft before him, but relied upon very copious *extracts* which he made from that work about eight years ago. Since obtaining the Critik, he has not had leisure for a thorough verification; but he hopes his statements will be found substantially correct.

JAMES MURDOCK.

New Haven, Sept. 17, 1842.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. I.

TWO MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.

Description and Character of the two modes. . Page 7

CHAP. II.

EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHIZING.

Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, &c. 14

CHAP. III.

METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

Des Cartes, Spinoza, Malebranche. 22

CHAP. IV.

THE FIRST GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

Leibnitz and Wolf. 33

CHAP. V.

KANT AND HIS CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Introductory Remarks. Critic on Sensation. Time and Space. 44

CHAP. VI.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Understanding defined. Its Conceptions. The Categories. 55

CHAP. VII.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Pure Reason. Transcendental Ideas. Rational Theology. 68

CHAP. VIII.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Results to which this Philosophy arrives. . . 79

CHAP. IX.

ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Effects of the Critical Philosophy. *Reinhold's* Doc-

trine of Thought. *Fichte's* Doctrine of Science, or Wissenschaftslehre. 93

CHAP. X.

PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Schelling's Doctrine of Identity, Identitatslehre. *Fichte's* altered Doctrine of Science. Other Pantheists. *Bouterwek, Bardili, Eschenmayer, Wagner, Krause.* 104

CHAP. XI.

PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Hegel's absolute Idealism. Logic the only Metaphysics. 118

CHAP. XII.

INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Jacobi's Philosophy of Faith or Instinct. His followers, *Koepen, von Weiler, Salat.* Ability and Honesty of the German Philosophers. *Schulze,* the only Skeptic among them, ... 129

CHAP. XIII.

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.

The new School in France. Its Origin, and Present State. Its Advocates. Its Doctrines. . 141

CHAP. XIV.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA.

Its Introduction. Coleridgeism. 156

CHAP. XV.

AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM.

Propriety of the Name. Its origin among us. Its radical Principles. 167

CHAP. XVI.

PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH.

Biographical Notice. His Psychology, Transcendental, Hegelian. Outline of his Philosophy. Its bearing on Theology. 189

REESE LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALIFORNIA.

CHAPTER I.

TWO MODES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.

Description and Character of the two Modes.

Two fundamentally different modes of Philosophizing have long prevailed, and have divided Philosophers into two general classes. Aristotle and Plato,—Bacon and Descartes,—Locke and Leibnitz,—the Scotch and English on the one hand, and the modern Germans with some of the recent French on the other,—represent the two classes. The first consider the human mind as born without knowledge, and as incapable of originating any knowledge, from itself, or by the mere exercise of its own powers. It must, they say, receive, from without, the subject matter of all knowledge; and this it does, especially, through the senses. Reflection on its own sensations and perceptions, gives form and consistency to the given matter derived from without; and thus leads to that true and perfect knowledge of things which is properly called philosophy.—The other class of philosophers do not deny, that the bodily senses are an inlet of knowledge; and

fied that this must, necessarily, and universally, hold good of every possible right lined triangle. But the empirical measurement of the angles of two, twenty, or a thousand triangles, could not produce the same result. It would only prove to us, that all the triangles we had examined, had been found to be of this character, not that all others must necessarily and certainly be of the same character. And so of all general truths or principles, if *Reason* discovers them or brings us acquainted with them, they have this character of universality and necessity; but if we have only empirical knowledge of them, they have not this character; they are only maxims of experience, and though they may serve as useful guides in matters of common life, they can not be made the foundation of demonstrative reasoning, or of absolute certainty; they can not be admitted into scientific reasoning; they belong not to the science of philosophy, but only to the mass of our empirical knowledge.

The two general modes of philosophizing above described, may be denominated the *empirical*, and the *metaphysical*. The term *empirical*, so current among the Germans, comes from the Greek EMPEIRIA, *experience*, which is derived from PEIRAN *to try*. It is not disrespectful in its import, and it well expresses the thing intended.

The term *metaphysical* is used, as being suited to convey to Americans a correct idea of the other mode of philosophizing. The Germans do not use it in this connexion, but call this mode of philosophizing the *rational*, and the scientific mode.

The manner in which these two classes of philosophers regard each other, may easily be conceived. The empirical class, not believing the human mind to possess any higher power than that of the intellect or understanding, and supposing man to be incapable of any other than empirical knowledge, of course look upon the metaphysical philosophers as idle dreamers, who mistake the workings of the imagination, and unreal speculations, for truths of the highest order. Despising such fancied wisdom, they will not take pains to acquaint themselves with it. It is to them all moonshine, and unworthy the attention of one who seeks only for solid and useful knowledge. On the other hand, the metaphysical philosophers regard the empirical as mere children in science, and strangers to the noble powers of human *Reason*, that divine or Godlike principle in man. Like the ancient navigators, they timidly coast along the shores of the vast ocean of human knowledge, keeping always in sight of land; they never venture to

launch forth in search of foreign realms, depending on the sure principles of science to guide their adventurous course. Such explorers, say the metaphysicians, may indeed advance the physical sciences by their close observation of nature, and by their laborious experiments upon her phenomena; but they must ever remain strangers to even the first principles of true philosophy, and can never erect a solid and enduring system of philosophical science. For, although they actually adopt, unconsciously, many of the principles of rational knowledge, and apply them in their philosophical investigations, yet not relying solely on such principles, or building exclusively upon them, but relying equally upon empirical principles, commingling both, and erecting superstructures out of both, their systems lack entirely that character for certainty, solidity, and pure science, which will entitle them to confidence and to the appellation of true philosophy.

We may add, that the *spirit* and the *tendency* of the two modes of philosophizing are very different. The one is slow, cautious, dubitating, and modest. It examines every thing, fears deception and mistake, and seldom ventures to be positive or dogmatical. The other is more daring, bold, and self-confident: it feels its own

strength, is proud of its lofty powers, and therefore inclines to be dogmatical and overbearing. The former prompts men to enquire, to hesitate, to confine themselves down to sense, and to distrust all that can not be put to the test of fair experiment. Hence it has actually led multitudes to skepticism, to materialism, and to infidelity. The other prompts to an over-weening estimate of the powers of human reason, to bold and hasty conclusions, and to the excessive love of novelty and of paradox. And hence it has actually led to the exaltation of reason above revelation, to bold and confident dogmatism, to idealism, to pantheism, and to transcendent supernaturalism.

In conclusion, we remark that the English, the Scotch, and the Americans, almost universally, belong to the empirical school; while nearly all the Germans, several of the latest French philosophers, with a very few in England and America, belong to the metaphysical school.

CHAPTER II.

EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHIZING.

Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, &c.

In the first Chapter, two fundamentally different modes of philosophizing were described. The present Chapter will relate to the history of them, anterior to the recent German systems of philosophy.

The founders of the two schools were Aristotle and Plato: the former pursuing the empirical, the latter the metaphysical method. During the middle ages, Aristotle had most adherents, but Plato found here and there a few followers.

Prior to the 17th century, the empirical philosophers made almost no experiments, but took up their first impressions as adequate, and proceeded immediately to generalization and the construction of systems. But in the beginning of this century, Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, published his Chart of the Sciences, and his New Method of pursuing them—de Augmentis Scientiarum, in 1605, and Novum Organum, in 1620—in which he recommended dependence on reiterated and well conducted experiments, as being the only sure method of advancing the physical sciences. Lord Bacon's works put the

friends of these sciences upon a new course; which has been pursued to the present time, and with the most splendid results. The brilliant achievements of the empirical method in these departments of knowledge, tended to bring the metaphysical method of philosophizing into discredit in regard to every branch of philosophy, especially in England and France; yet, for a time, there were a few who pursued the metaphysical method, especially in ethics, natural theology, and the law of nations. Thus, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, a contemporary of Bacon, held to connate knowledge, or to general truths latent in the soul as it comes into life. And H. More and R. Cudworth, both Platonists, believed in moral and religious ideas either born with us, or coming to us by immediate inspiration from God In France, also, Des Cartes attempted, though with little success, to revive the metaphysical method in all the sciences. In England, however, the metaphysical method was nearly extinct, when Mr. Locke, in the year 1698, attacked it, and wholly exterminated it from the British soil, by his famous Essay on the Human Understanding. In this elaborate and classical work, Mr. Locke confutes the doctrine of innate or connate ideas, and maintains, that all human knowledge is acquired, or is the result of sensation or reflection; that is, it is

either obtained directly through the bodily senses, or it originates from reflection on what is so obtained. In addition to these common and fundamental principles of the empiric school, he maintained the objective reality of our knowledge of the external world. In his view, all our ideas are either *simple* or *complex:* the former are derived immediately from our sensations and reflection, and exactly correspond with the real nature and essence of things. The latter are formed by the understanding, being compounded of simple ideas; and when duly compounded, they also correspond with the nature of things. Mr. Locke's book has been classical, and its principles have maintained the highest authority, in all the empirical schools down to the present time. The work was soon translated into French, and subsequently into other languages; and for more than a century it was revered and followed, very much as the writings of Aristotle were in the days of the schoolmen.

It has already been stated, that the spirit of this mode of philosophizing is slow, cautious, dubitating and modest: it examines every thing, fears deception and mistake, and seldom ventures to be positive or dogmatical. At the same time, as it prompts men to inquire, to hesitate, to confine themselves much to the senses, and to distrust all that cannot be put to the test of ex-

periment, it has led multitudes to skepticism, to materialism, and to infidelity. The proof of this lies in the fact, that from this school have proceeded all the English and French freethinkers, deists, skeptics, materialists and atheists, from the age of Bacon down to the present day; and that these, one and all, have depended on arguments which they derived from this philosophy, and from no other, to support their peculiar opinions; and they have claimed for themselves exclusively the appellation of *philosophers*, because they thus followed this philosophy to its legitimate results, unrestrained and untrammeled by vulgar prejudices and by traditional belief. Of the *skeptics*, David Hume, and his imitators and admirers, are a striking example. As to the *deists*, we might cite the whole catalogue, both English and French: Hobbes, Blount, Rochester, Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Woolston, Tindal, Morgan, Chubb, Bolingbroke, Hume, Gibbon, &c., among the English; and Rousseau, Voltaire, D'Argens, Toussaint, Buffon, Raynal, Condorcet, St. Lambert, Dupuis, D'Alembert and Diderot, the encyclopedists, and all the other infidel philosophers of France. Of *materialists* from this school, (and I know of none from any other,) we may name as pre-eminent, Hobbes, Shaftesbury and Priestley, among the

English; and De la Mettrie and Helvetius, among the French. Among the avowed *atheists* in this school, we may mention De la Mettrie, Diderot, the Baron d'Holbach, Naigeon, Marechal, and the astronomer, De la Lande.

As all these erratic philosophers belonged to the empirical school, and professed only to follow this philosophy into its legitimate consequences, the defenders of the Bible and of Christianity have labored much, to shew that this philosophy, instead of subverting Christianity and all revealed religion, really confirms and supports them, if it be rightly understood and applied. And to make good this position, some of them have ventured to modify certain tenets of Mr Locke, yet without departing from his fundamental principles. Thus, Bishop Berkeley discarded the idea, that by the bodily senses we apprehend material objects themselves, and become acquainted with their real nature. The senses, he maintained, can apprehend only the *phenomena* of external objects, or their impressions on our organs. Hence, he inferred, we know nothing of the nature of the world without, or the material world, except that it is an incomprehensible *cause* of various effects or impressions on our bodily senses. And he deemed it most philosophical, to suppose that the great

REESE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

First Cause and Author of all things, is, himself the immediate producer of these sensations in us; and that material objects, as secondary and intervening causes between God and us, are mere fictions of our imaginations. In short, he denied the existence of *matter* altogether; and maintained, that God and inferior or finite spirits, (angelic and human,) are the only real existences in the universe. By this amendment of Mr. Locke's system, the excellent bishop hoped to bring all philosophers to believe, that they literally *see* and *hear* and *feel* the immediate *power* of God, present every moment with them, and operating all around them. And such a belief, he imagined, would banish infidelity and irreligion from every philosophic mind: but the idealism or spiritualism of Berkeley, has not met general approbation.

After this, Tho. Reid, Ja. Beattie, and some others, in order to confute Hume's skepticism, Berkeley's idealism, and other aberrations from the common belief, without renouncing the empirical mode of philosophizing, called in the aid of *common sense*, or the common apprehensions of the unsophisticated mind, as a supreme arbiter in such controversies. They did not recall the long exploded doctrine of innate ideas, nor adopt that of the intuitions and judgments of

reason, as a higher power of the mind—which would have been to take their stand among the metaphysical philosophers—but they held, that certain instinctive apprehensions of mankind at large, apprehensions which mysteriously accompany all our ordinary sensations, and are independent of all reasoning and all philosophy, are often more sound and correct than the apprehensions and conclusions of the most acute philosophers. Thus, by making the principles of common sense, or a mysterious and incomprehensible instinct, more to be relied on than philosophical reasoning, and by teaching that the latter must succomb to the former in case of disagreement—they virtually taught, that the empirical mode of philosophizing is unsafe, without a regulator and a guide; and, that unphilosophical conclusions are often more correct than those of philosophy. This new doctrine of common sense, without being formally recognized by all, has spread widely among empirical philosophers in England, France and America; and it has been the frequent refuge of many, when grappling with adversaries whose arguments they were unable to confute by sound logical reasoning.

Subsequent to these chief innovators upon Mr. Locke's system, Dugald Stewart, Tho. Brown,

and others, have carefully revised, enlarged and perfected the whole system, by elaborate treatises on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, constructed on pure Baconian principles. In France also, the Abbe Condillac, Chas. de Bonnet, and some others have attempted to improve upon Locke.

The valuable treatises of various individuals of this school, on particular branches of philosophy, such as ethics, natural theology, the law of nations, &c., are omitted, as not being necessary to the main object of these essays, which is, to convey to Americans some clear and correct ideas of the modern German philosophy. And for the same reason, the elaborate researches and invaluable discoveries of numerous successful explorers of nature, in all her departments, are here passed in silence. The voluminous publications of the so called Philosophical Societies, and the numberless other profound works on natural science, show the wonderful achievements of experimental philosophy, when directed to its proper objects, and prosecuted according to Lord Bacon's rules.

CHAPTER III.

METAPHYSICAL PHILOSOPHERS.

Des Cartes, Spinoza, Malebranche.

The metaphysical mode of philosophizing does not, like the empirical, decide every point separately, and on independent grounds; but it searches after *general truths*, or *first principles*, and by applying them to specific cases in a logical manner, it obtains a *scientific answer* to every question.

The modern history of this mode of philosophizing commences with RENE DES CARTES, a French nobleman of fine talents, who flourished in the 2d quarter of the 17th century. Dissatisfied with all the systems of philosophy then prevailing, he undertook to form a more solid one, based on certain knowledge.

He began with the enquiry, *What does man know, with perfect certainty?* And he found an answer, in the consciousness that he was then

thinking. He therefore inferred his *own existence* to be certainly known: (cogito: ergo sum:) and also, that he was a *thinking being*. But he was likewise conscious, that his mental powers were very limited; he could comprehend only a small part of the numberless objects around him. At the same time, he could conceive of a mind capable of comprehending every thing; and not only capable of understanding, but also of creating and upholding all things, and possessing every possible perfection. This idea he found floating in his mind, and he was not conscious of having designedly fabricated it: he therefore concluded, that it came to him from without, and from that infinite Being himself, of whom it was the idea. There is then a God, an all-perfect Being; and our idea of him is innate. He likewise proved the existence of God, by the marks of wisdom and design visible every where in the natural world. And from the perfections of the divine Being who created us, he inferred the truth and infallibility of human reasoning, when properly conducted; because it is not conceivable, that such a Creator would endow us with faculties calculated to mislead us. *Clearness* and *distinctness*, he supposed, are the evidence of the truth or certainty of our knowledge. The bodily senses seldom afford clear and distinct knowl-

edge; and therefore such knowledge as they afford, can not always be depended on. But, besides the perceptions of the senses, we have ideas formed in the mind, by reasoning and reflection; and also innate ideas, or ideas implanted in our minds by our Creator. The last (our innate ideas) are the most clear and certain, and therefore the best sources of argumentation. The ideas formed in the mind are the next in value for reasoning; because they can be made clear and distinct, if we are only careful to always think clearly and distinctly.

Assuming the broad principle, that all clear and distinct ideas contain true objective knowledge, Des Cartes was less careful to search for the origin, and to demonstrate the correctness of our ideas, than to make his own ideas clear and distinct. And this was the chief source of his many errors, and of his baseless theories: for when he had analyzed any of his conceptions and made them very clear and distinct to his own mind, he conceived them to be objectively true, or to correspond with the real nature and essence of things. In this way, he was led to believe, that the very essence of *mind* or spirit consists in *thinking;* and the very essence of *matter* in mere *extension.* Hence, he inferred, spirits can have no extension, and no parts; and matter can

never think, perceive, or will. And, as extension is the very essence of matter, there can be no void space, or space unoccupied by matter; and consequently, the material universe is an infinitely extended *plenum;* and of course, all motion of bodies must produce a kind of *vortices* or whirlpools. The *soul*, having no extension, is uncompounded; and therefore, it can never be dissolved or die, being in its very nature immortal. But the *brutes* are not immortal; of course they can have no souls, and are mere *machines*, with no thoughts, no volitions, and no perceptions. To explain the mode of communication between the soul and the body, he supposed a very subtile fluid, secreted from the blood and called animal spirits, to circulate in the nerves, and to convey intelligence from every part of the body to the soul resident in the pineal gland of the brain; and thence, also, to convey the commands of the soul to all the muscles employed in voluntary motion.

Des Cartes was a man of genius, a fine writer, and, in general, a sound logical reasoner. Yet his premises were too often mere assumptions; and his conclusions of course, without support. He struck out many new thoughts, and he was the first in modern times, to frame a regular system of philosophy based on metaphy-

sical reasoning. His writings excited much attention, and they prompted many to engage in philosophical studies; but they also met with great opposition. Gassendi and the adherents to the Baconian method, of course rejected Des Cartes' views. The Jesuits in France, and many of the protestants in Holland, did the same. In England, he scarcely had a follower. His principal adherents were, in France, several of the Messieurs de Port-Royal, especially Malebranche, and in Holland, Spinoza and a few others.

The next metaphysical philosopher claiming a place in this sketch, was BENEDICT SPINOZA, a learned Jew of Amsterdam, who died at the age of 45, in the year 1677.

He had studied the Talmud, and was dissatisfied with its doctrines. Being discarded by the Jews for his opinions, he associated with Christians, and among them, read and admired the writings of Des Cartes. But he thought the system of that philospher susceptible of improvement.

Des Cartes had defined a *substance* to be, "a thing which so exists, as not to depend on any thing else for its existence." And he had said, that in this its proper sense, the term belongs exclusively to the self-existent God. Relying on the correctness of this definition, *Spinoza* main-

tained, that there is but *one* proper *substance* in the universe; namely, the self-existent and all-perfect God. All other creatures and things, not only originated from this one infinite substance, but in such a manner as to consist of it, and be inseparable from it. They exist in God, and God in them. As to essence or substance, the whole universe is God; God existing and operating in numberless modes and forms, which his infinite wisdom has devised. According to this theory, God himself is *natura naturans*, as the philosophers express it; and the created universe is *natura naturata*. Spinozism, however, is not the Berkeleyan theory so extended as to include *minds* as well as material things. Berkeley supposed material objects, to be nothing more than a constant *divine operation*, supplying the place of permanent material causes. But Spinoza did not suppose either matter or mind, to be nothing more than a divine operation; he admitted them to be a proper *product*, or rather *efflux*, of divine power, (though sustained and actuated permanently by the divine Being,) and having in themselves the power of action, according to certain laws impressed upon them.

With Dés Cartes, he held the essence of *mind* to consist in *thinking*, and the essence of *matter* to consist in *extension*. And believing that there

is but one proper *substance*, or self-existent Being, from whom and in whom all created beings and things have their existence, he supposed this self-existing substance or Being, to be at once, infinite *mind* or thinking power, and infinite *extension*: and that when he creates finite minds, it is, by sending forth a portion of his thinking power, to think, and will, and choose, according to certain laws; and when he creates material objects, he in like manner sends forth a portion of his other essential nature, *extension*, to fill assigned places, to move and be moved, and to exhibit all the phenomena which we ascribe to material bodies.

All *actions*, he supposed to be *necessary*, or governed by the laws of causation; even those of God himself, who cannot act otherwise than he does, being compelled by his own infinite attributes. Yet we may say, God acts *freely;* because he is self-moved, or acts only from internal impulses. *Man*, on the contrary, does not act freely; not only because he is a dependent existence, but also, because he is a finite being, and is subject to a thousand influences from the objects around him.

All the divine perceptions or ideas, he supposed, are absolutely perfect: and all our ideas would also fully accord with the nature of things,

if we were always careful to think according to the laws of thinking. It is only illegitimate and careless thinking, that can lead to error; since the human mind, though finite, is an efflux of the infinite and all-perfect mind. The object which we can the most perfectly know or comprehend, is the divine Being himself; in whom we exist, and who is constantly developing himself in each and every created thing around us. To know and contemplate God, is man's highest bliss; and to obey his commands, is man's highest freedom.

Such is the best outline I can give of Spinoza's pantheistic system. It is manifest, that he carried his speculations quite beyond the bounds of human knowledge, and ran into downright *transcendentism*, in which obscurity must ever reign. But he also wrote in very barbarous Latin, and is a very obscure writer. I have not relied so much upon my own power to unravel his enigmas, as on the labors of those Germans, who have attentively studied his works in order to compare his opinions with those of the recent German pantheists. Spinoza had scarcely a single follower, in the age in which he lived; and he was generally regarded with abhorrence, as being an atheist, and a subverter of all that is rational. And yet he is reported to have been a

very amiable man, perfectly correct in morals, and devout also, in his way.

The next philosopher we shall mention, was the pious NICHOLAS MALEBRANCHE, of the Congregation of the Oratory at Paris, who died in 1715, at the age of 77. His principal work was, the Search after Truth, first published in 1673, and afterwards, much altered and enlarged in 1712, only 3 years before his death.

Malebranche, it has been said, was the most profound metaphysician that France ever produced. He was an original thinker; he called no man master. Yet he took much from Plato, Augustine, and Des Cartes. From the last he took, unaltered, his ideas of *substance*, of *mind*, and of *matter*.

He undertook to search out, and to portray, the *sources* both of *error* and of true *knowledge*.— The great source of *error*, he supposed to be, the following of the senses and the imagination.— And the only source of true and certain *knowledge*, he held to be, God himself. His grand principle was, WE SEE ALL THINGS IN GOD. The manner in which we do so, (notwithstanding the pains he took to explain himself,) is not very clear. Sometimes he seems to hold to a sort of mystical union and communion of the soul with God, in which God imparts knowledge to us.—

At other times, and more generally, he seems to come very near to Spinoza's pantheistic notions. For he held the soul to be a portion of the divine Logos or Reason; and the material world, to be a development of the one infinite substance; and both to exist still in God, and to be incapable of any action whatever, except as God works in them. The immediate objects of all our knowledge of things, he declares to be the *ideas* of things, not the things themselves. These ideas of things existed in the divine mind, or in God, before any thing was created; and, when we direct our views upon God, we behold these ideas of things, just as they exist in the divine mind; and this is true knowledge. These ideas of things, existing in God, and which we can behold in him, are not the ideas or images of individual objects, but general or abstract ideas, the ideas of the genera and species of things; by knowing which we know the very essence or the true nature of all things material and immaterial. And as these ideas of things are, at all times, to be seen in God, we may, by viewing them in him, have a true knowledge even of objects that never fell under the cognizance of our senses, or were never the objects of our empirical knowledge. When we contemplate external objects only through the bodily senses, we obtain only indistinct images

of those things; and we must turn our view to God, and contemplate the ideas of those things in him, or we can not have any correct and adequate knowledge of them. So when we attend to our own internal consciousnesses, and endeavor thence to obtain a knowledge of our own souls or minds, we have only indistinct conceptions, until we look to God, and contemplate the *idea* of a soul, as it there exists in the most perfect form.—We may now see, why Malebranche considered reliance on empirical knowledge, as the grand source of all errors. We may also learn what he intended, when he said, *God is our intelligible world.* God himself, we are able to behold with immediate vision; and in him, we may see the perfect ideas of all created things. Innate ideas, Malebranche did not admit; such ideas being unnecessary for those who can at any moment see the perfect ideas of all things in the ever present God.

The truly religious spirit in which Malebranche wrote, his easy and alluring style, and his very ingenious reasoning, caused his writings to be much read and admired; but the complete ascendency of the empirical mode of philosophizing, prevented his views from gaining much currency.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FIRST GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.

Leibnitz and Wolf.

We come now to the rise of the first German Philosophy. Its author was GODFREY WILLIAM VON LEIBNITZ, a contemporary of Locke and Malebranche, and a man whom any nation might be proud to call its own. He was a general scholar, acute, ingenious, and indefatigable in his exertions to advance both literature and science. Although he gave much of his time to the study of philosophy, and became the father of the first German system of that science, yet he had not leisure to compose a general treatise on the subject.

He pursued the metaphysical method; imitating in this the example of Plato and Des Cartes, whom he diligently studied, but did not servilely follow. His aim was, to reform the systems of his predecessors, and to make philosophy as perfect a science of reason, as the pure mathe-

matics. In this way he hoped to put an end to all strife and all controversy, not only among philosophers themselves, but between them and theologians, moralists, and others. To accomplish this object, he proposed to treat philosophy in the mathematical manner; that is, by laying down such first principles as none can deny, and then giving logical demonstrations of every proposition. This method he deemed practicable, because necessary general truths are not confined to the mathematics, but belong equally to philosophy. These truths, he justly supposed, are not the result of experience, but have their foundation in the mind itself. He considered them to be innate, or a part of that intellectual furniture which we receive from the Creator, and which become developed by reflection. The ground of their certainty, lies in the divine constitution of things; and the perception or knowledge of them, is what distinguishes a rational soul from the souls of brutes.

But unfortunately, Leibnitz did not build his superstructure, entirely, of such solid materials. He held, (with Mr. Locke,) that all simple ideas of sensation (simple perceptions by the senses) are *objectively true;* that is, they correspond perfectly with their objects. And he also maintained, (with Des Cartes and others,) that all the

simple ideas of reason are objectively true, or accord with the real nature and essence of things. At the same time, he confounded the *logically true*, viz. what involves no contradiction or absurdity, with the *really true*, or the true in fact. Hence he supposed that, by mere *thinking*, we may arrive at the knowledge of all those primary truths or first principles of things, from which may be deduced, by logical reasoning, a complete system of philosophical knowledge. The Cartesian doctrine, that clearness and distinctness of ideas is adequate evidence of their truth or correctness, Leibnitz discarded as fallacious. He proposed more rational and logical tests of truth; namely, for all abstract and general truths, the principle which lies at the foundation of mathematical demonstrations, that of *identity* or *contradiction;* and for all questions of fact or real existence, the principle of *adequate cause*, or, that whatever occurs or exists must have a cause. And on this last principle of reasoning, he proved the being of a God from the existence of the world around us. He likewise deemed the ontological proof, or that derived from the conception of a God in our own minds, to be valid proof.

As specimens of his deductions from these first principles and laws of philosophing, we may

consider his doctrines of *Monads*, of pre-established *Harmony*, and of the *Best System* of the world.

1. His doctrine of Monads. All the objects apprehended by our senses, he said, are compounded bodies, or such as may be separated into parts. How far the subdivisions of matter may be carried, our senses from their obtuseness, can not determine. But *infinite divisibility* is inconceivable and absurd. Yet the smallest possible subdivisions of any and every substance, must have no parts; and of course, can have no dimensions, no figure or shape, and no exterior or interior. Such elementary parts, he denominated *Monads*. And as these Monads can have no *external* qualities, (dimensions, shape, color, &c.) all their qualities must be strictly *internal*. But the only strictly internal qualities are those of *mind*, such as sensibility, thought, volition, &c. Hence all Monads must be, in their nature, living active beings, or minds.—Our knowledge extends to *four kinds* of Monads, and no more. First in the order of excellence is the self-existing God, the author and upholder of all the other Monads, the Monas Monadum, who is infinite in all his attributes. Next in order are finite spirits and human souls. These are distinguished from their great parent Monad, by being finite

and dependent minds; and they are distinguished from the lower orders of Monads by possessing reason. The third order are the souls of brutes; which have the power of perception, thought, and volition, but are not capable of understanding either general or necessary and eternal truths. The fourth and lowest order of Monads are sleeping, unconscious, and unthinking beings; yet they possess life, feeling, and the power of action; and they are always blindly struggling to change their condition. Aggregates of Monads of this fourth and lowest order, constitute material bodies. One Monad of the third order, surrounded by an organized aggregate of Monads of the fourth class, constitutes a brute animal. And one Monad of the second order, surrounded by a similar aggregate of Monads of the lowest order, constitutes a man or a human being. Such being the essential nature of all existing beings and things, *space* and *time* can be nothing more than the *arrangement* of Monads, considered as co-existent or as existing in succession. Both are mere ideal things, or things without real existence. By this doctrine of Monads, Leibnitz supposed he could explain, what Plato intended by ideas, and Aristotle by his *entelechias;* and likewise overthrow entirely the pantheism of Spinoza.

2. His doctrine of pre-established Harmony. As the created Monads have no external qualities, no shape, no dimensions, no interior or exterior parts,—it is impossible, that they should act upon one another in a physical manner. One Monad cannot penetrate another, nor can one touch another externally. Each is, in its nature, as independent of all physical actions from the others, as it would be were it the only Monad in existence. In other words, as Monads have only *internal* qualities, or those of minds;—it is impossible that they should either act, or be acted upon, mechanically.—How then can we accouut for the constant action and reaction apparent throughout the material world; and for the control of the mind over the body, and the influences of the body on the mind, in human beings? He replies: the created universe is an organized whole. Each Monad stands connected with the whole system, but has special relations to the Monads nearest to it, and in every living being, the unthinking Monads form a sort of world around the intelligent Monad which is its soul. Now, by a law of their Creator, impressed on them when they first issued from his hands, every finite Monad is compelled to act conformably to its relations, or to do and to endure whatever its relations require, in order to a perfect harmony

in all the movements of this vast and complicated machinery. And this law of the Creator is what he denominates the *pre-established Harmony*. Hence, the apparent action of finite Monads on each other is, in reality, *divine* action, or the result of an original law of the Creator; and by this law, God secures infallibly those results, which he contemplated when he formed the universe.

3. His *Best System* of the world.—In his Theodicee, or Essay on the goodness of God, free-will in man, and the origin of evil,—Leibnitz maintained that, among the many possible systems for a created universe, God has chosen the very best: and that this may be proved from his perfections. His infinite wisdom could devise the best system, his infinite goodness would choose it, and his infinite power would then produce it. Hence, the present system must be the best possible in its place: and nothing could be changed, without changing the system and rendering it less perfect. God indeed chooses nothing, for its own sake, but what is good. But physical evil or imperfection, is inseparable from whatever is finite; and of course, such evil must pervade a world of finite beings and things.—From this imperfection of all finite beings and things, *natural evils* (pain and suffering) naturally

and necessarily follow; and *moral evil* or sin, is likewise a natural, though not a necessary consequence. Natural evil God chose; not indeed for its own sake, but as the means of good. He designed it for chastisement or punishment; and, by the pre-established Harmony of the universe, he causes it naturally to overtake sooner or later the transgressors. Moral evil or sin, arises naturally from the *free-will* of finite rational beings: and God does not choose it, but only *permits* it; and he permits it, because he could not otherwise have the best possible system.—*Free-will* consists in acting according to our own *choice*, and without any compulsion or physical necessity. But our *choice* is determined always by the circumstances in which we are placed. It therefore depends, in all cases, on the pre-established Harmony of the universe; and of course it was, from eternity, absolutely *certain* how we would choose in every instance.

This system of philosophy spread rapidly, and soon became the national philosophy of Protestant Germany. The man who did the most to explain and recommend it to his countrymen, was CHRISTIAN WOLF, who died in 1754, at the age of 75. He drew out and expanded the principles of Leibnitz into a complete system; and composed, for this purpose, elementary works on

nearly every branch of the science. And, as many of his treatises were written in the vernacular language, this philosophy spread among the common people. Wolf resolutely met every assailant, and spent his life in explaining and defending the Leibnitzian principles: and hence, this system has obtained the name of the Leibnitzian-Wolfian Philosophy. In regard to principles, Wolf scarcely deviated at all from Leibnitz; except in denying sensations to the lowest order of Monads, and in confining the so called pre-established Harmony to the mutual intercourse of the soul and body. But in practical or moral philosophy, of which Leibnitz did not treat, Wolf devised a new central point, or fundamental principle; viz. that of *perfection*, as comprising all that is morally right and obligatory. According to this principle, the *whole duty* of man consists in *striving after perfection*, in himself and in all around him; the perfection of his entire character and condition, for time and eternity. As Wolf surveyed the whole field of philosophy, so he distributed it into its several departments; a thing which had not before been done. He divided all philosophy into *theoretical* and *practical*, the former treating of rational *knowledge*, and the latter of rational *conduct*. Theoretical philosophy he divided into *Logic* and *Met-*

aphysics; and under Metaphysics he included *Ontology*, metaphysical (not empirical) *Psychology*, *Cosmology*, and natural *Theology.*— Practical or moral philosophy he divided into *Ethics*, the *Law of Nature*, and *National Policy.* And this classification of the Philosophical Sciences, with the addition of *Æsthetics*, has been generally followed in Germany quite to the present time. In all his elementary treatises, which were numerous, Wolf pursued strictly the mathematical method. He also introduced a multitude of new technical terms, derived chiefly from the Greek language; nearly all of which have since passed into common use in the German schools.

This Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy reached its culminating point, about the middle of the 18th century. Soon afterwards, from various causes, it began to decline. Many had all along questioned the soundness of its principles, and still more, the tendencies of some of its doctrines. The downright pedantry of most of its advocates, who dogmatized ostentatiously, and stuffed their writings with formal demonstrations of the simplest truths, rendered it disgusting to well informed minds. About the same time, Mr. Locke's principles, or those of the empirical school, found their way into Germany. And

these principles were propagated in, and along with, the writings of the English and French deists and skeptics, (Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, &c.) which began now to circulate extensively, and to produce in that country a set of free-thinkers and contemners of long established opinions. The friends of revealed religion were alarmed at the progress of infidelity and skepticism, under the assumed name of philosophy; and they anxiously enquired: What is true philosophy? It was amid this state of things, that EMANUEL KANT appeared on the stage, as a master spirit controlling and guiding public opinion by his superior talents.

CHAPTER V.

KANT AND HIS CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Introductory Remarks. Critic on Sensation. Time and Space.

EMANUEL KANT was born at Konigsberg, in the year 1724, and spent his whole life in that city, never having been more than 22 English miles from it. He first studied theology, then became a lecturer, and afterwards a professor of logic and metaphysics, in the university; and died in 1804, at the age of 80. That he was a man of great acuteness, and a patient investigator, his works evince; and that he was a man of pure morals, conscientious, upright, modest, and amiable, is the testimony of all who knew him. He has been called the modern Socrates; and, emphatically, the Philosopher of Konigsberg.

Kant arose at a most critical period in Germany. French and English infidelity had just broken into the country, and threatened to sweep away all the established religious opinions and institutions. Metaphysics was sinking into dis-

repute. The Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy was waning; and the disgusting dogmatism of its advocates only hastened its downfall. Many were bewildered, and having little confidence in any system of philosophy, adopted eclecticism as the safest guide to truth. And Hume's skepticism was spreading and undermining all established opinions. It was, to arrest this progress of infidelity, to raise the sinking character of metaphysical learning, to discourage dogmatism and eclecticism, and to guard the public mind against the withering influence of skepticism, that this great man undertook to discriminate between true philosophy and false, to point out the nature, use, and ends of the former, and to unmask the sophistry of the latter.

With most of his countrymen, he considered philosophy to be *rational science*, or the product of *pure Reason;* and divisible into two parts, the one *speculative* or theoretical, and the other *practical* or moral, the former treating of rational *knowledge*, and the latter of rational *conduct.* He expresses himself thus: "All the interests of my Reason center on these three questions; *What can I know? What ought I to do?* and, *What may I hope for?*" The *first* of these questions, he says, belongs wholly to *speculative* Reason; the *second* belongs wholly to *practical*

Reason; and the *third* belongs to *both;* because, when practical Reason has decided the question in a general manner, speculative Reason must come in to define more particularly what it is we may hope for. (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p, 833.

Kant believed, that the failure of every preceding attempt to establish a sound philosophy, had arisen from the admission of unsound materials into the foundations of the building, or from the assumption in the outset, that we have rational knowledge of things, of which we have not such knowledge. Hence, he wisely concluded that the only safe and sure method of proceeding, was, to begin by tracing human knowledge to its sources, to examine all the functions of the mind concerned with the production or enlargement of knowledge, and to subject the whole process of the mind to the most rigid criticism before the tribunal of pure Reason. Such therefore was the method of proceeding which he himself adopted, and which he pursued rigorously, and with uncommon industry and perseverance.

The work which he composed in answer to the first inquiry of Reason, *What can I know*, is the most celebrated of all his works, and is intitled a CRITIC OF PURE REASON. It was the

result of many years' labor, was first published in 1781, and fills an 8vo vol. of nearly 900 pages. The title of the book is expressive of its true character: it is a criticism of pure Reason on the powers of the human mind in regard to knowledge, showing definitely how far they can go, and where human knowledge must ever stop, so long as the mind is dependent solely on its own resources. The work is not properly a *system* of philosophical knowledge, embracing a summary of all that philosophy can teach: it is rather an introduction to sound philosophizing. And, so far as I can judge from their titles, and from the representations of others, (for I have not had access to them,) most of his other philosophical works are of a similar character; that is, they are critical introductions to the several branches of science of which they treat. Such I understand to be, his Critic of Practical Reason; his Critic of the Judging Faculty; his Prolegomena to every future system of Metaphysics that can claim to be scientific; a Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals; &c. &c.—Such being the character of Kant's writings, we cannot expect to find in them a statement of his opinions on all the important questions in philosophy; but, only the fundamental principles of his mode of reasoning and judging on such questions.

In the Introduction to his Critic of Pure Reason, Kant first discriminates between pure *knowledge a priori* and *empirical knowledge*. The former has the characteristics of *universality* and *necessity*—(the same as described in No. I. of these Essays)—the latter has not these characteristics, but always relates to particular facts or things which have fallen under observation. He then tell us, that the former kind of knowledge is the proper basis of all philosophy. He next observes, that philosophy requires a *previous science*, which shall determine the *possibility*, the *principles*, and the *extent* of this pure knowledge a priori. He then discriminates between *analytical* and *synthetical* judgments. In the former, the predicate is really and truly contained in the subject; and a mere explanation evolves it. But in synthetical judgments, the predicate lies out of the subject, and the judgment advances to meet it. Of this kind are, all our judgments of experience. Now it is a question of fundamental importance, whether *synthetical judgments a priori*, or synthetical judgments of pure Reason, are *possible*. If they are not possible, then Reason can only form analytical judgments; that is, she can only analyze her few and scanty pure ideas. But he concludes such judgments to be possible, in certain cases; and

that they actually occur in all the theoretical sciences, in mathematics, in the physical sciences, and in metaphysics. Such judgments, however, can never relate to the *matter* of our knowledge, which must always be given; but solely to the *forms* of our knowledge, or to the general principles or *laws* by which our intellectual faculties are governed. These general principles or laws by which our intellectual faculties are governed, Reason can discover a priori, or by the mere inspection of these faculties and their mode of operation; and, having discovered them, she can in some measure anticipate experience, or determine beforehand what is possible and what is not possible in human experience.—And hence, there is a field open for exploration by that previous science, which philosophy requires. This previous science, he denominates Transcendental Philosophy; and of it he will treat in his Critic of Pure Reason. He divides the work into two parts; the first and much the largest, treats of the elements of this new science, or it surveys all the faculties of the mind that afford us knowledge, and criticises their several products; the *second* part gives the general results of the previous survey, and states the uses of this preliminary science.

We now come to the Critic itself. Following

the established doctrine of metaphysical philosophers, that we possess *three* distinct faculties, Sensation, Understanding, and Reason; Kant first subjects *Sensation* to the scrutiny of Reason. And he makes Reason decide, that this faculty is a mere *receptivity* of the impressions made upon our senses by the objects around us. Sensation therefore brings to us no knowledge of the essential nature of external objects, but only of their *Phenomena*. The unknown objects which make the impressions, Kant calls *Noumena* (νοούμενα, from νοεῖν to *understand*;) that is, things which are understood or conceived to exist, but of which we have no certain knowledge, and of which consequently we can give no further account. *Phenomena* therefore, and phenomena alone, are the elementary *matter* of all our knowledge of the sensible world around us.

But Reason can discover a priori or by pure intuition, that these phenomena must present themselves to our senses either as being simultaneous, or as being consecutive; and if simultaneous, they must have a relative location, and if consecutive, they must follow each other in some order, and with a greater or less degree of rapidity. And thus pure Reason perceives, intuitively, that all external phenomena must present them-

selves to our senses as being limited and bounded by *time* and *place*. Time and place, then, are pure intuitions of Reason: they are not *things* existing in nature, nor are they the *properties* nor the *relations* of things in nature; they are purely *ideal things*, and are merely the *laws of sensation*, the *forms* of the phenomena of external sense, or the *aspects* in which those phenomena must always present themselves to our senses. Whether any other beings—God, for instance—must also view material objects as existing in time and place, we do not know. And, as time and place are merely the *laws of Sensation*, we have no right to predicate them, or either of them, of God, of spirits, or of any abstract truths or ideas. For, these objects never presenting themselves to the bodily senses, can never fall under the laws of sensation.

But although time and space are merely ideal things, or mere laws of sensation, yet they are empirical realities; that is, they always accompany our sensations, and, without them, sensible perceptions can not exist. And being thus empirical realities, and at the same time perfectly simple ideas, with no composition and no qualities whatever, except mere magnitude, they are capable of being adequately depicted or represented by diagrams and numbers, and thus of

becoming themselves the objects of sensible intuition. And hence they lay a foundation for a pure science of Reason, namely mathematics. But no other of our simple ideas can be thus depicted and subjected to sensible intuition; and therefore they can never become the subject of a pure science of Reason.

Such in general is the result of Kant's criticism of the sensitive faculty. His views of the wide difference between noumena and phenomena, seem to have met general approbation. But his ideas of *time* and *place*, though accordant with the dogmas of the Wolfian school, have been controverted. Many can not persuade themselves that noumena, or *things themselves*, have nothing to do with time and place. And indeed, if we may predicate time and place of phenomena, it seems difficult to say why they are not equally predicable of noumena; on the supposition that noumena really exist, and are the immediate physical causes of phenomena. For how can physical *effects* be limited to time and place, and not also the physical *causes* which produce them? Can a material thing operate or produce effects, where it is not present? Or can Reason any more conceive, a priori, of a necessity for phenomena to exist only in time and place, than for noumena to exist in the same manner? If

then Reason decides a priori, or intuitively, that phenomena must so exist, does she not equally decide a priori, or intuitively, that noumena must so exist? It is no objection to this reasoning, that we do not understand the essential nature of noumena; or that we know nothing of them, except that they are created *things* and the immediate cause of all the phenomena of the material world. For, by assigning them time and place to exist in, we affirm nothing respecting their nature or essence, but merely the *when* and the *where* of their existence and operation. Besides, we must suppose that there is an unknown difference of *properties* in different noumena, in order to account for their producing different phenomena. And if we are compelled to make such a supposition, notwithstanding our total ignorance of the essential nature of noumena; why may we not assign them *locations* in time and place, in consistency with the same ignorance of their essential nature?

Kant indeed tells us in a subsequent part of the Critic, (Elements, Pt. II. B. II. Ch. III.) that all our knowledge of external objects is limited to the *conditions* which render *experience possible;* and therefore we can never attain to a knowledge [he should have said, to *empirical* knowledge] of any objects which can not be

subjected to the senses. Hence the only objects known to us [empirically] are *phenomena*. The *objects of real existence*, which present to us these phenomena, we do not know. Yet, as *we admit*, and *ought to admit*, *their existence*, they may be called *noumena*. This statement may be fully admitted, without reducing time and place to mere forms of our sensations, having no relation to things themselves or to noumena.—For it is not contended, that we have *empirical knowledge* of the *fact* that noumena exist in time and place. We only *infer* the fact, from the known and necessary existence of their phenomena in this manner. It is *Reason* which compels us to admit the fact, and not experience; just as it is Reason, and not experience, which compels us to admit the more general fact that noumena really exist.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Understanding defined. Its Conceptions. The Categories.

The faculty of Sensation having been examined at the bar of Reason, the *Understanding* is next arraigned before the same tribunal.—Reason pronounces the Understanding or Intellect, to be an *active faculty* of the mind; and not a mere receptivity like Sensation. It is the office of this faculty, to take the multifarious impressions on the senses, or the *crude matter* of knowledge, just as it is brought into the mind by the sensitive faculty, and to shape and fashion it into *conceptions* of objects, and *judgments* concerning them. The Understanding, therefore, is that faculty of the mind, which forms conceptions and judgments of the objects around us. In other words, it is the faculty which *thinks* and *judges* of all the objects apprehended by our bodily senses. To facilitate her operations, (which are incessant, and endlessly various, and requiring

not only accuracy, but great despatch,) the human Understanding classes all objects of frequent occurrence, under genera and species, and forms both a conception and a name for each class.

According to the received doctrine of the metaphysical school, this faculty, like that of Sensation, is common to man with the brutes, yet in men, it may have some powers, which it has not in brutes; arising, perhaps, from its being combined with Reason in us, and not in them. In men, the *Understanding* is distinguished from *Reason*, by the *sphere* of its action, by the *objects* with which it is concerned, and by the *product* of its labors. The sphere of its action is the *sensible world*, or the world of phenomena; the objects with which it is concerned, are *sensations*, *conceptions*, and simple *judgments;* and the product of its labors, is *empirical knowledge*. The sphere of the operations of *Reason*, on the contrary, is, the *supersensible world*, or the world of spirits, of ideas, of general truths, of virtue, &c.; the objects with which it concerns itself, are *ideas*, (not conceptions,) things which the mind can contemplate, but which can never be subjected to the senses; and its product is, *rational knowledge*, or knowledge of universal and necessary truths. The con-

founding of *Reason* with *Understanding*, and of *Ideas* with *Conceptions*, by Mr. Locke, in his Essay on the Human Understanding, and by most of the English, Scotch, and American writers since the days of Locke, (though it was a natural, and almost necessary consequence of supposing all human knowledge to be derived from sensations, and reflections on them,) has spread much obscurity and confusion through all the metaphysical productions of these writers; and, by introducing the indiscriminate use of terms which should never be confounded, it has contributed not a little to render the English language unfit for clear and conclusive reasoning on metaphysical subjects. And, I apprehend that this is one great reason, why so many among us can not understand and appreciate the writings of the German philosophers. Their clear, precise, and definite thoughts, the moment they are translated into English, become obscure, indefinite and vague; because the language, into which they are translated, is so. It is true that the Germans have introduced a multitude of new technical terms into philosophy, which sound very strange in our ears; and Kant, in particular, has been censured, even by his own countrymen, for his excessive coinage: but if our language had appropriate terms for expressing the more neces-

sary distinctions of thought, we might contrive some way to avoid the use of German technics, and yet convey to English minds the real views of the German writers.—After this necessary digression, we will return to the Kantean Criticism.

The *conceptions* of the Understanding constitute all our knowledge of material objects or things; or rather, they are the very *objects themselves*, so far as we know them; for they are combinations of *phenomena;* and beyond phenomena, our knowledge of things does not extend. These conceptions are a sort of mental *images* of sensible things. Each image is composed of more or fewer distinct impressions, which were made by the object on our senses, when we examined it; such as, figure, color, dimensions, attitude, position, motion, taste, smell, noise or sound, its feeling, its actions, its operations on other objects, and the effects of other objects upon it. These various impressions are called the *characters* or *marks* of the thing; and, when duly combined in the mental picture, they constitute the *conception* of the object. As we sometimes wish to examine *individual marks* or characters of objects, separately, or uncombined with other marks, this gives rise to *abstract conceptions*, or conceptions of the qualities or attri-

butes of objects. And, observing that various objects in nature possess many marks in common, the Understanding combines those common marks into separate conceptions; and thus she forms conceptions of species, genera, and higher, and still higher genera. But it is obvious that, as the conceptions mount upwards to the higher and more general classes, they must contain fewer and fewer marks. The conception of an individual object, will contain all the marks, which belong to that object; the conception of the *species*, will contain only the marks common to all the individuals of the species; and the conception of the *genus*, only the marks common to the genus: and so of the higher genera. Conceptions, therefore, always become more meager or more simple, the more extensive their sphere; that is, the greater the variety of the objects they embrace, the fewer are the marks they contain.

In forming these various conceptions, the Understanding exhibits the skill and judgment of a practiced architect. Scarcely any object in nature presents itself to the senses, as absolutely isolated or alone. Along with the impressions from the object itself, many other impressions, from the connected or surrounding objects, enter the mind; for the sensitive faculty, like a faithful mirror, presents them all just as they strike upon

it; and the Understanding has to separate them, in order to combine together only those belonging to the object itself. This often requires a very critical examination of the impressions or marks, and a discriminating judgment. And when the proper marks or impressions are selected, they must be skillfully combined, in order to form a correct mental picture of the object. In referring individual objects or things to their proper species, and species to their genera, accurate discrimination is necessary. And in putting her conceptions together, so as to form from them a correct and useful system of empirical knowledge, great skill and judgment are requisite. Yet all this, the Understanding learns by practice, to perform with much accuracy and despatch.

After glancing at these manifold and important operations of the Understanding, (which it is the proper business of Logic, or the Art of Thinking, to describe more fully,) Kant makes Reason to decide, that the Understanding is wholly dependent on the sensitive faculty, for all the *materials* of her knowledge. She is the mere *architect* to select, to combine, and to arrange the materials brought into the mind by Sensation. Hence, the Understanding can produce no knowledge, except what is *empirical*.—

REESE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

She can not enlarge, at all, our rational or philosophical knowledge.

But, by inspecting the operations of this skillful architect, Reason discovers, that the Understanding has four *pure ideas;* which serve her as general laws or principles, by which to construct her conceptions, and regulate her judgments, of all the objects of sensible intuition.—These four ideas, to which Kant gives the name of Categories, are those of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *modality*. When the Understanding would form a conception, or a judgment, of any new bundle of impressions brought to her by the senses, or would test the correctness of any conception or judgment already formed, she calls to her aid these four ideas; and they suggest, that the thing must be examined as to its *quantity*, its *quality*, its *relations*, and its *modality;* and they also teach, that there are *three*, and only three, results under each inquiry, to which the Understanding can come.

1. The first inquiry respects the logical *quantity* of an object or conception. And the only possible answers are, it is a *unity*, a *plurality*, *or* a *totality*. For instance, the conception bearing the appellation *man*, must denote either a *single* man, or a *plurality* of men, or *man in general*, that is *mankind*, the *total race* of men.—

There are only these three subcategories, under the general category of logical quantity.

2. The second inquiry respects the logical *quality* of an object or conception: (*qualitas*, from *qualis*, of *what sort* or kind.)—To answer this inquiry, the Understanding places the object by the side of another object, whose quality is known, and then affirms their *agreement*, or their *disagreement*, or decides that they agree *in part*, or in a *limited* degree. Proceeding in such a manner, the Understanding affirms that, this object *is an animal;* that other object *is not an animal;* it is a plant; and that third object *is partly an animal*, and *partly not;* it is a *zoophyte*. So she declares, this house *is painted;* that house *is unpainted;* and that third house *is partly painted*, and *partly unpainted*. Thus, *affirmation*, *negation*, and *limitation* of the affirmation or negation, are all the subcategories of logical quality.

3. The third inquiry respects the *relation* of the object or conception to other objects or conceptions. There are *three*, and only three, species of relations; namely, *inherence*, *dependence*, and *external connection* or *coherence*. The relation of *inherence* is, that which exists between *substances* and the *attributes* of substances.—The relation of *dependence* is, that which exists

between *causes* and their *effects*. The relation of *external connection* or coherence is, that which exists between any *object* and the *surrounding objects:* for all objects have their places in the universe, or are surrounded by other objects, with which they are more or less closely connected.

4. The fourth inquiry respects the *modality*, or the *mode of existence* of an object, so far as it is known to us. According to our apprehensions of things, we may predicate of them *possible* existence, *actual* existence, or *necessary* existence. Whatever accords with the formal conditions of experience, or is not contradicted by any law of human experience, is *possible* or *may exist*.— What is directly attested by our experience or observation, is *actual* or *really exists*. What all human experience requires, necessarily, *must exist*, or *exists necessarily*. Of this necessary existence, there are two kinds, the one internal, absolute, and unconditional; as, *roundness* in a *circle;* because, if you take away the roundness, it is no longer a circle. The other is external, and hypothetical, or conditional, depending on the laws of *causation;* as, every child that is born, *must have* a father and a mother. "Every house is builded by some man." A ponderous body, in the air, *must fall*, if it is not supported.

It is manifest, from a mere inspection of these categories, and of our continual use of them, that they give form or shape to all our conceptions and judgments of sensible objects. They are the all-pervading *laws* of human *thinking*, and of human *language*.

It is therefore of importance to inquire, from what source did these categories *originate*; what is the ground of their *validity*; and what limits are there to the *application* of them.—That they did not originate from a knowledge of the nature of *things themselves*, or of *noumena*, must be manifest; because we have no such knowledge of things themselves: all our knowledge of sensible objects, is confined to *phenomena*. It seems then, that the categories must have been derived solely from the inspection of phenomena. And, as they are pure *ideas*, they must be the product of *Reason*, the only faculty which produces ideas. This higher faculty of the mind, in contemplating phenomenal matter, perceived it to be capable of being arranged under the categories; and as the Understanding needs some formulæ for her conceptions and judgments, in order to make them capable of being wrought into a system of empirical knowledge at the suggestion of her sister faculty, Reason, the Understanding tried the system of the categories; and, finding the sys-

tem to work well, and to produce no discoverable errors or mistakes, she continues to frame all her conceptions and judgments according to these formulæ. Such, Reason pronounces to be the *origin* of the categories, so far she can discover. And the admission of such an origin of them, will account for the superiority of the human Understanding, which is aided by Reason, over the Understanding of brutes which is not so aided.—The *validity* of the categories, therefore, or the right of the Understanding to make use of them, arises from the *necessity* of her having some formulæ to guide her, and from the *experience* of solid advantages, and no serious evils, arising from the use of them.—But, from this view of the subject, it is most obvious, that we have no authority for extending the use of the categories beyond the sphere of our sensible intuitions. We have no authority for applying them to *noumena*, nor to any thing supersensible; because we do not *know*, either a priori, or from experience, that such things can be brought under their empire, without producing misapprehensions and erroneous conclusions. We can not test the results of such application, by *experience*, as we are able to do in the sphere of sensible intuitions; and hence, we can never make such application on safe and solid grounds.—Yet when

we venture beyond the sphere of our sensible intuitions, and attempt to discuss such questions, as, Whether the world had a beginning; Whether there is a God; &c. it seems allowable to apply the categories to them; because knowledge on such subjects must rest on *some* principles of reasoning, and we can discover none better than the categories. Still we should not forget, that this is a transcendent use of the categories, or an application of them transcending the principles of *certain* knowledge.—Such, in general, are the doctrines of Kant, in regard to the human Understanding.

Whether he has not gone too far, in confining the legimate application of the categories solely to the phenomena of the sensible world, may be questioned. The remarks made in the preceeding Chapter on Kant's doctrine concerning *time* and *place*, (the categories of Sensation,) that they are merely our mode of intuiting phenomena, may be applied with little variation to his doctrine concerning the categories of the Understanding. It was there stated, that we must suppose some unknown *difference of properties* to exist in different *noumena*, in order to account for their producing different *phenomena*. Now it is admitted by all, that phenomena accord very well with the categories. May we not then conclude, that *noumena* also must possess such a differ-

ence of properties, as will make the categories in some measure applicable to them? The supposition does not imply, that the categories lead us to any *objective knowledge* of the inherent properties of noumena, or of any other supersensible things. It only permits us to say that, from the diversity of their effects or phenomena, we are authorized to judge, that they *do differ;* and that they *so differ*, as to present to us *phenomena* corresponding with their own inherent differences.—It is at least true, that Reason can discover, a priori, no valid reason why the categories should not be as applicable to supersensible things, as to the phenomena of sensible things. If the term *man* may always be so used as to denote either an *individual* man, or a *plurality* of men, or the *whole race* of men; why may not the term *angel*, in like manner, be always used to denote either an *individual* angel, or a *plurality* of angels, or the *whole host* of angels? Can Reason discover any other or better ground for the application of this category of *quantity*, in the one case, than in the other? And so of all the categories. Indeed, the simple fact that philosophers and metaphysicians, in all ages, have applied the categories to supersensible things, unhesitatingly, and most abundantly, shows that *Reason* discovers no difficulties in making the application.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Pure Reason. Transcendental Ideas. Rational Theology.

Kant next brings theoretical *Reason*, that higher intellectual faculty of man, under a critical examination.

The distinction between *speculative* or theoretical Reason, which imparts to us *rational knowledge*, and *practical* or moral Reason, which enjoins upon us *rational conduct*, has already been noticed. Our present concern is with the former.—It will be recollected, that the sphere of theoretical Reason is the *supersensible world*, the world of *spirits*, of *general truths*, of *virtue*, &c.; that the *objects* with which it is concerned, are *ideas*, things which the mind can contemplate, but which can never be subjected to the senses; and that the product of its labors is *rational knowledge*, the knowledge of universal and necessary truths.

The distinction between *analytical* and *synthetical* judgments, was stated in the Introduction to the Critic: and the power of Reason to form

synthetic judgments a priori, was there limited to the mere *forms* of our knowledge; that is, to the determining what is possible, and what is not possible, in human experience. In regard to all objects of real existence, she can form only *analytical* judgments, unless the objects are given or already *known*. And hence, to form *analytical judgments* by means of middle terms, or to reason in the logical manner, is the only function of theoretical Reason in regard to our knowledge of whatever may exist around us, within us, or above us. But analytical judgments are those in which the *predicate* is really and truly contained in the *subject* of the proposition. Of course theoretical or speculative Reason can never acquaint us with any unknown object, that may exist within us, around us, or above us. She can only draw forth the knowledge of these objects, which we already possess, or can only present it to us in a different attitude and form.

To establish these strong positions respecting the importance of speculative Reason, Kant institutes an elaborate examination of what he calls the *transcendental ideas of pure Reason*, that is, the *ideas* which Reason attempts to form, by a logical deduction, of the *nature* and *essential properties* of the human *soul*, of the material

world, and of *God:* and he shows, that the supposed logical deduction is unsound and fallacious.

I. As to the idea of the *soul:*—The reasoning which attempts to educe a knowledge of its *nature* and of its *inherent properties*, from those *acts* of the soul of which we all are conscious, is a mere *paralogism.* In the assertions, *I think, I love, I hate, I will, I choose, I remember, &c.*, various actions are affirmed of the subject *I;* and on the most solid grounds, because we are conscious of those acts. But the *actions* of any being or thing, are not the *thing itself;* nor are they any part either of its *essential nature*, or of its *inherent attributes.* We may indeed infer, that whatever *acts*, must *really exist;* and that it must be of such a nature as to be *capable* of performing the acts ascribed to it. But all this implies no knowledge of the *mode of its existence*, or of those *inherent qualities* which make it capable of performing the acts. Hence, the following reasoning is wholly inconclusive. *I think;* therefore I am a *thinking Substance.*—That substance is not perceived by the external senses, but only by internal *consciousness*; it is therefore *immaterial* or a *Spirit.* It has no perceptible or conceivable *parts;* it is therefore a *simple* Substance. Being a *simple* substance,

and *immaterial*, it must be of an immortal or *undying* nature. It acts in and by the bodily organs; and therefore it is the *Soul*, the *animating principle* of the body. All this is sophistical reasoning; because it mistakes the *subject* of the consciousness, for the *object* of that consciousness. It is sophisma figuræ dictionis.—But, though inconclusive as reasoning, it may nevertheless be true: and it may serve as a convenient basis of a system of psychology.

II. The *cosmological ideas* of pure Reason, or those transcendental ideas which Reason forms of the *external world*, are equally baseless, considered as the results of logical reasoning.—For, both the thesis and the antithesis of them, may be proved by very similar arguments. Thus it may be proved—(1.) That the world had a beginning in time, and is of limited or finite extent; and, on the contrary, that it had no beginning in time, and has no limits in extent.—(2.) That all substances consist of *simple* elementary parts, (or *Monads*, as Leibnitz called them;) and, on the contrary, that no substance whatever consists of such simple elements, because such simple elements can not exist. (3.) That physical causes can not be the *only* causes in existence, there must be a *free cause*, to give existence to the physical causes; and,

on the contrary, that no *free cause* can possibly exist, and conseqently physical causes alone must exist.—(4.) That there must be, either in the world, or beyond it, a Being who exists *necessarily*, and who is the *first cause* of all things; and, on the contrary, that no such Being exists, either in the world, or beyond it.—As specimens of the arguments adduced by Kant, take the following:

The 3d *Thesis* is thus proved: Unless we assume a cause *prior* to the first physical cause, and commencing the series of physical causes, there will be no cause for the whole series of physical causes, and of course none for any part of it. We must therefore suppose an *uncaused cause*, prior to the first physical cause. But an *uncaused cause* must be one that is *free*, or one that acts without being *compelled* to act by any higher cause. The *Antithesis* is thus proved: Every causality is itself a *change*, since it is the *state* of the cause when *in action*, which is different from its *state* when *not in action*. Now as every *change* presupposes a cause, the change in the supposed free cause, by which it proceeds to action, must have a cause. And therefore, there can not be any *free cause*, or one that acts without being *caused to act*.

The *4th Thesis* is thus proved: The world is

full of changes. But the existence of every change is *conditioned;* i. e. it presupposes something which is its *condition*, or a cause on which it depends. Now if there were no existence that is absolutely *unconditioned*, the conditioned could not be conditioned. Consequently, there must be an *absolutely necessary Being*, whose existence is *unconditioned* or uncaused: otherwise the series of the CONDITIONS or causes would be incomplete. The *Antithesis* is thus proved: Every *member* of a series of changes must of course be conditioned. Hence, the supposed absolutely unconditioned Being, if in the world, and a part of the series, must himself be a *conditioned Being;* contrary to the thesis. And if such a Being existed *out of* the world and commenced the series of changes in the world, his *causality* at least would *belong to the world*, and of course he would constitute a *part of the series:* which contradicts itself. We must therefore reject the thesis altogether, in order to make the series of the CONDITIONED complete.

The objects of these cosmological ideas lie wholly beyond the reach of experience. Hence, experience can never decide in favor of either the Theses or the Antitheses. Reason alone must solve her own contradictions. The side of the Theses, is that which good men incline to

take; and it may be called the *Dogmatism of pure Reason.* The side of the Antitheses is that, which is espoused by philosophizing skeptics; and, as its arguments are founded on the principles of *pure empiricism*, this side may be called the *Empiricism of pure Reason.*

Critical Idealism, which admits and even demonstrates the existence of *noumena* or things lying beyond all sensible intuition, can alone solve these dialectical contradictions. This critical Idealism is equally removed from *materialism*, which supposes we can have sensible intuitions of *noumena*, and from *empirical Idealism*, which denies the existence of *noumena.* Now this *critical Idealism*, by maintaining that sensible intuition extends only to phenomena, or that we have *empirical knowledge* only of what is sensible, does not deny the possibility of *some* knowledge, other than empirical, of objects lying beyond the reach of our senses. It only warns us not to strive after *empirical* knowledge of such subjects, and not to reason about them upon the supposition of such knowledge. Taking this stand, and carefully examining both the Theses and the Antitheses respecting the cosmological ideas, critical Idealism declares that both *may be true*, because they relate to different things.—The *Antitheses* direct attention only to *phenom-*

ena or the objects of empirical knowledge: but the *Theses* look beyond phenomena, to their *cause;* and they consider the total series of phenomena as complete and dependent as a whole, on an *intelligible cause* lying without the bounds of nature. Hence, both the Theses and the Antitheses may be true; the one maintaining, e. g. that there is a God *beyond nature*, and the other that there is no God *within nature*. And so in all the contradictions, one side includes an *intelligible thing* among the phenomena of nature; which the other does not, but only *reasons back* through phenomena, to an intelligible thing lying beyond them. And therefore, though the side of the Theses failed of proving its assertions with apodictical certainty, yet the opposite party failed of proving the contrary, there not being any such contradiction as would make the one proof overthrow the other. Nor can the latter party overthrow the Theses of the former, unless it can prove, e. g. that *out of* and *beyond nature* there is no God, or in other words, that the *supposition* is itself absurd and self-contradictory, which it is not.

III. The third transcendental idea of pure Reason, is that of a *supreme* and *all-perfect Being*. Reason is disposed to admit the existence of such a Being, because she needs this *perfect*

See Hunt, pp 482-483

ideal of absolute excellence, and still more, because her moral wants demand it. But the arguments of speculative Reason to prove that such a Being exists, are defective.

The *ontological* proof, or that derived from the very idea of a God, (that to be a *perfect* Being, he must be a *necessary* existence, and that a *necessary existence* can not but exist,) is entirely fallacious, being a mere *assumption* of the thing to be proved, and then inferring it from that assumption. The *cosmolgical* proof, or that stated in the Theses of the third and fourth cosmological ideas, besides the objections already noticed can only prove a *first cause*, which is *uncaused*; and not, that this first cause is the *great ideal* himself. This argument therefore rests upon the ontological for support. And the *physico-theological* proof, or that founded on the marks of *wisdom* and *design* in the works of nature, is illogically reasoning from objects of experience among men, to objects lying wholly out of the reach of all human experience; and moreover, if admitted, it does not prove the author of nature to be an *infinite* and *perfect* Being, but only a Being of *sufficient* intelligence and power to produce such a world as this. Hence, this argument also falls back on the ontological proof.

' Kant here goes into a *Critic of all Theology*,

on the ground of speculative Reason.—*Theology* is the knowledge of an *Original Being*, a *God*, the *Author of all things*. This knowledge may be derived either from mere *Reason*, or from *Revelation*. In the former case, it is *rational theology* (theologia rationalis;) in the latter case it is *revealed theology* (theologia revelata.)—Again; rational theology is either *transcendental* theology, or it is *natural theology*.

Transcendental theology, which is that of a *Deist*, contemplates its object as it is presented to us in those *transcendental ideas*, of which we have been treating. It therefore regards God as being known to us merely as the *original cause* of all things, (ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium.) Yet as it does not *deny* him to be an *intelligent Being*, we must say, that it *admits* the existence of a God. In so far as it takes the cosmological ideas for its basis, it may be called *cosmo-theology:* and in so far as it relies on the ontological argument for proof, it may be called *onto-theology*.

Natural theology is that of a *Theist*. It contemplates its object as being an infinite *Intelligence* or *Mind*, of which the human mind is the finite image or likeness. It therefore recognizes a *living God*, a *Being* of boundless intelligence, who by his wisdom and power created and gov-

erns the world. This theology alone can satisfy the wants of man.—It is *physico-theology*, so far as it relies upon the physico-theological proof of the existence of a God; that is, so far as it infers, from the beauty and order of the natural world, an *all-wise Architect;* just as, from any production of human art, we infer that it had an intelligent fabricator. But it is *moral theology* when, from the *moral law* within us, it infers a moral government of the rational universe; and of course, a supreme *Lawgiver* and *Judge*, who takes account of human actions, and will reward or punish every man according to his deserts.

From all that has been said in the preceding criticism of Reason, it will be seen, that every attempt to establish theology on a scientific basis, by means of mere *speculative Reason*, must be futile. It can not be done. Yet when *practical Reason*, by means of the moral law within us, has taught us to believe and to confide in God, *speculative Reason* may be of use, to purify our conceptions and to give form and consistency to our theological views.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

The Results to which this Philosophy leads.

We now come to the concluding part of the Critic of pure Reason.

The author says: If we compare a system of transcendental philosophy with an edifice, the former part of this work has examined the *materials* of which the edifice is composed, and this second part will survey the *plan* of it. And here we shall have to treat of a *Discipline*, a *Canon*, an *Architectonic*, and a *History* of pure Reason.

I. *Discipline of pure reason.*—A *discipline* is the opposite of a *culture*. It restrains, and ultimately destroys, the constant inclination to swerve from and overleap the rules by which we should be governed. *Culture* carries us forward in the right way; *discipline* keeps us back from pursuing wrong ways.

(1.) *Discipline of pure reason in its dogmatic use.*

Philosophical knowledge is rational knowledge derived *immediately from ideas* or *abstract conceptions*. *Mathematical* knowledge is ration-

al knowledge derived from the *construction* of such ideas or conceptions; that is, from *schemata*, diagrams, or sensible representations of the conceptions. Mathematics is concerned only with *quantities;* which are always capable of being adequately constructed or represented to the eye. But philosophy is concerned with *qualities*, which can not be thus constructed or represented. And this it is, makes the wide difference between mathematics and philosophy. For all our knowledge rests ultimately on *intuitions* of the objects of it. But philosophical knowledge can have no other than *empirical intuitions* of its objects, while mathematical knowledge can make its most abstract conceptions the object of *direct intuition* by means of its constructions. Thus we can construct a *conical figure*, which shall represent all cones; but we can never construct the *color* of a cone: nor can we draw any *diagram* which shall adequately represent *simple existence*, though we may easily draw one to represent *extension* or *magnitude*. For example; ask a mathematician what is the sum of the three angles of every right-lined triangle, and he will draw his diagram to represent every possible triangle, and will demonstrate by it that the *sum* must be equal to two right angles; and his diagram subjects the whole to our intuition.

Now ask a *philosopher*, the same question, and he goes to *analyzing his abstract conceptions* of angles and lines, but can never find an answer in this way. So the *algebraist* represents adequately his quantities, known and unknown, by *letters;* and then by a regular process, he can solve his problems. But the philosopher can not make out any such sensible representations of his general conceptions: he can only *analyze* them; unless he will recur to the sensible intuition of the *objects themselves*, i. e. of some individual thing under the genus; which will afford only *empirical*, and never *philosophical* knowledge of them. Hence, all purely *philosophical reasoning* is *discursive* or purely *logical*, that is, is based immediately on our conceptions. But *mathematical reasoning* is not purely logical, as it rests on *intuitions of the general conceptions, by means of its constructions.* Mathematics and philosophy are therefore essentially different sciences; and the precision and certainty of the former can never be carried into the latter.

Philosophy can not make out complete DEFINITIONS of the objects of which it treats, as mathematics can do. For those objects are either *empirical facts*, with regard to which we are liable to much deception, and which are moreover always *particular facts*, and not uni-

versal truths; or they are *pure conceptions* a priori, (e. g. substance, cause, right, equity, &c.) and therefore so *obscure* as to be incapable of any adequate description on which reliance can be placed. We can indeed expound *our conceptions* of the things; but we can never be certain that our conceptions correspond exactly with the things as they exist. On the contrary, the *objects of the mathematician,* being always *arbitrary* combinations or creations of the mind, and also capable of *construction,* and of course of being *intuited,* are the only objects that will admit of *perfect definitions.*

Philosophy moreover can not have her AXIOMS, as mathematics can. For all *axioms* are propositions so clear and evident, from mere inspection, as to need no proof. Now mathematics, by means of her constructions, can submit many of her fundamental positions to our immediate *inspection;* and therefore she has her axioms.—But philosophy, being unable to construct any thing, has to depend wholly on discursive or logical reasoning, and therefore can have no axioms. For, all discursive reasoning is merely the *analyzing* of our conceptions, and therefore it can *educe* from those conceptions only what is really and truly contained in them. Philosophy can make no *synthetic judgments a priori* respecting the

objects of nature, but only *empirical* judgments: and she can *reason* about them only *discursively*, that is, logically.—Direct *synthetic* judgments from *perceptions*, are *Dogmata:* similar judgments from *construction*, are *Mathemata*. Now all *Dogmata* are uncertain; *Mathemata* are not.

(2.) *Discipline of pure reason in its polemic use.*—By its polemic use, I intend, its use in *defending* positions against the dogmatical deniers of them, or in maintaining that the *contrary* cannot be *proved*, or even be shown to be more *probable*.

Here Kant introduces those critical remarks on the theses and antitheses of reason in regard to her cosmological ideas, which were quoted in our last number.

He then proceeds: The Critic of pure reason is the proper *tribunal*, before which all the contests of pure reason should be brought.—Without the aid of this tribunal, reason is situated like men in a state of nature, where no impartial decision of controversies is practicable, but the parties must fight it out, and never come to agreement.—This critic may put us at ease, and dispel all fear lest the enemies of religion should succeed in overthrowing the belief of a God, of the immortality of the soul, a future state, &c. They can never do any such thing. At the same time, it teaches us not to rely on the

ordinary proofs, (the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological,) as alone adequate, and such as none but bad men can hesitate to admit: and it shews us, that *moral proofs*, derived from practical reason, and from the reasonableness of the things themselves, must be our chief reliance. Such a critic should never lead us to become *skeptics*, like Hume and Priestley; but by showing us the true boundaries of rational knowledge, it should keep us from *dogmatism*. The first steps taken in matters of pure reason, are apt to make us *dogmatists*, as being yet but children in knowledge. The next steps bring us into perplexities, and seem to require universal *skepticism*. But the third and last steps (those of sound criticism) show us the limits of true rational knowledge, and dispel *skepticism* as well as *dogmatism*.

(3.) *Discipline of pure reason in regard to hypotheses.*

Admitting that the conclusions of pure reason in matters of fact are not proved with apodictical certainty, it may still be a question whether those conclusions may not be received as *hypotheses*, and be used advantageously as such. And undoubtedly they may be so received and used, in certain cases; but not in all cases, and for all purposes. In particular, they may be used to

answer objections; by showing the objector that his arguments are liable to exceptions. But they must never be made the foundation of any system of *positive knowledge*. In the field of speculative reason, this rule is necessary, in order that nothing may be assumed without the evidence of certainty. But in the field of *practical* reason, which does not aim to evince *truth*, but only to advance the best interests of man, the same caution in regard to hypotheses is not necessary.

II. *The Canon of pure reason.*—By a *Canon*, he tells us, he intends a *summary of the principles* a priori of the *right use*, in general, of any of our intellectual powers. Thus the analysis of the powers of the understanding, in the first part of the work, is a *canon* of pure *understanding*.

(1.) Of the *ultimate aims* of the pure use of *our reason.*—It may be asked, *What* are the *problems*, which it is the ultimate aim of pure reason to solve? The answer is: The speculations of reason in her transcendental operations all center on three subjects; viz. the *freedom of the will*, the *immortality of the soul*, and the *existence of a God*. But the merely speculative interests of reason in regard to all the three subjects, are very small, and hardly worth pursuing through so much toil. Because, the sum of our

philosophical *knowledge* would be very little enlarged by an affirmative decision of these questions. But it is far otherwise in regard to *practical reason*, or when the question comes up, What ought we to do.

(2.) Of an *idea of the supreme good*, as determining the aim of pure reason.—All the interests of my reason unite in these three questions: I. *What can I know?* II. *What ought I to do?* III. *What may I hope for?* The *first* question belongs wholly to *speculative* reason; and it has (I trust) been adequately answered already.—The *second* question belongs wholly to *practical* reason. It is not however *transcendental*, but *moral;* and therefore does not belong to this Critic. The *third* question is both *practical* and *theoretical:* because, when practical reason has decided it in a general manner, speculative reason must come in to *define particularly* what we may hope for.

The *second* question, *What ought I to do*, enquires after a *rule of duty*, not after a mere *rule of expediency*, or a *path to happiness*. Complete happiness would consist in the full, entire, and eternal satisfaction of all our propensities or desires. And a rule to guide us to such a state, must be founded on *empirical* principles; because *experience* alone can show us *what* our

propensities are, and what will *satisfy* them. A *moral law*, on the contrary, shows us what will render us *worthy to be happy*. It overlooks our propensities, and the means of their gratification. It treats us as *free rational beings*, and points us to the *conditions* of our being made happy. It must therefore rest on the mere *ideas of pure reason*, and must be known a priori. I *assume* the existence of such a *moral law;* and I refer to the *moral judgment* of every man, who will candidly examine his own moral feelings, for authority to make the assumption.—Pure reason, in her practical or moral exercise, is our voucher for some principles of the possibility of experience, namely, for the *practicability* of such actions as will accord with the precepts of the moral law. For, if the law *imperatively commands* certain actions, those actions must be *possible*, and the performance of them depends on our free will. And hence, the *principles* of pure reason, in her practical or moral capacity, must have *objective reality*.—From the absolute demands of the moral law, we also infer the possibility of a *moral system* or *unity;* of which, however, speculative reason can have no knowledge, because her province does not extend over the territory of *free will*. A *moral world* would be one conforming to all the precepts of the

moral law. Such a world must be *possible*, in consequence of the freedom of the will; and such *ought to be* the character of the existing world. It must be an *intellectual* world, and not a physical; because it must be free from all *compulsion*, and must make no allowances for the weaknesses and imperfections of human nature. The *idea* of such a world *has objective reality*, not from any actual intuition of it, but as an object of pure *practical reason*.—Thus we answer the first of the two questions of pure practical reason, *(What must I do?)*—namely, *obey* perfectly the *moral law;* make the *existence of a moral world* to be a *reality;* or in other words, *do that, which will render you worthy of happiness.*

The last question is, *If I do so, may I expect to be happy?* And, from the principles of pure practical reason, we infer an affirmative answer. For we have seen, that a *moral world* (one in which every man shall do what he ought to do) *ought to exist;* such being the imperative command of the moral law. But the possible existence of such a world *presupposes* a *supreme moral ruler* or *lawgiver* who *wills its existence;* because, no otherwise can such a world be possible. Blind nature could never produce it. So then, there must be a *supreme Reason*, which *legislates on moral principles*, and which is also

the author of nature. Such an *Intelligence*, connecting a *perfect moral will* in creatures with their *highest happiness*, and thus causing all the happiness which results from morality, I denominate *the ideal of the supreme good*. Now, as we do not find the world around us, or the present state of things to be such a *moral world* as we have seen should exist, and in which perfect happiness reigns, we necessarily infer a *future state*, an *unseen world*, in which all this shall be realized. This future state as distinguished from the kingdom of nature, Leibnitz called *the kingdom of grace*. Practical reason commands us to connect ourselves with the kingdom of grace, and to expect happines in it, provided we do not render ourselves unworthy of it. In order to our happiness, it is necessary that all our conduct be regulated by moral maxims; that is, by the precepts of the moral law. But reason *can not feel this necessity*, if she regards the moral law as a *mere idea* without objective reality. Hence, she is obliged to assume the existence of an *efficient cause*, a GOD, the maker and executor of this law. For if there be no God, and no future unseen state, the *ideas of morality* may excite our admiration or wonder, but can never become *efficient motives* controlling the will and conduct. Neither *happiness* alone, nor *morality* alone, (the

latter considered as rendering man *worthy* of happiness,) can be *reason's supreme good.* We must superadd the *expectation* of this happiness, *on condition* of being worthy of it. And hence the necessity of assuming that there is a GOD, the lawgiver, and the center of the moral unity, or head of the moral world. This supreme Intelligence must be *one*, not *many wills*, because many wills would destroy the *unity* of the moral world. He must be *omnipotent*, to order all things in subserviency to the unity of the moral world; *omniscient*, to know the inmost thoughts and purposes of creatures and their moral deserts; *omnipresent*, to order all events in subserviency to the interests of the moral world; and *eternal*, to conduct all events to their final issue.

(3.) *Of opinion, knowledge, and faith.*—*Truth* consists in the agreement of a proposition with the objects of real existence. The truth of a proposition may be admitted either on *objective grounds*, or *on subjective;* that is, either for causes existing in the *thing*, or for causes existing in our *own minds.* In the former case, the admission is *conviction;* in the latter it is *persuasion.* In persuasion there is frequently an illusion, the *subjective* ground being mistaken for an *objective.* To prove whether we are under such

illusion, propose the case to others, and see if their minds view it as we do.

To admit without the consciousness of either subjective or objective validity, is to *presume* or to *be of opinion.* If the ground of the admission is *subjectively adequate*, but *not objectively so*, the admission is *faith* or *belief:* as, e. g. when the object lies beyond our personal cognizance, and we admit the statement because we have *confidence* in the testimony of others, or for any other satisfactory reason existing in our own minds. If the ground is both *subjectively* and *objectively* adequate, the regarding as true is *knowledge;* we *know it.*

We should never venture to hold an *opinion*, without knowing something about the thing, which may render it possibly true. In the judgments of pure *speculative reason*, opinions are wholly inadmissible: the proposition must contain what is *known a priori*, and therefore have apodictical certainty or be rejected altogether. In the *transcendental* operations of pure reason, an *opinion* is too little, and *knowledge* too much to be expected. In the disquisitions of *practical reason*, *faith* or *belief* is admissible; and indeed, generally, it is all we can expect.

The two remaining chapters of the Critic of pure Reason, (viz. the Architectonic, or syste-

matic arrangement, and the History of pure reason,) are so concise, and contain so little to interest the reader, that I pass them in silence.

In these sketches, I have endeavored faithfully to exhibit the leading views of Kant in his most celebrated work, and to show in general the spirit and tendency of his Critical Philosophy. That I have in no instance misapprehended his meaning, is more than I dare assert. I can only say, I have done the best I could, to represent him fairly, and intelligibly, to my readers; so that they might be able to form some correct estimate of the merits and demerits of this coryphæus of modern German philosophers.

CHAPTER IX.

ANTI-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

Effects of the Critical Philosophy. *Reinhold's* Doctrine of Thought. *Fichte's* Doctrine of Science, or Wissenschaftslehre.

Kant's Critic of pure Reason, first published 1781, was little noticed for a few years; and thus it suddenly arrested the attention of all Germany. The majority of the learned assailed it, as subverting many of the best established truths, narrowing far too much the boundaries of human knowledge, and rendering philosophy a meagre science of little value or importance. The Wolfian dogmatists considered it as a direct attack upon their doctrines: and the philosophizing dogmatists regarded it as little short of a protestation against all philosophy. Still it found numerous friends; and it was speedily admitted and expounded in all the universities. And it was soon apparent, that it had completely subverted the older systems of philosophy; and that it had roused the lovers of science throughout Germany, to high enthusiasm for metaphysical studies, and especially for investigating the foun-

dation, source, and origin of rational knowledge. During a very few years, more new and essentially different bases for systems of philosophy were brought forward, and elaborately discussed, in Germany, than in all the rest of Europe since the revival of learning. Some of these were only modifications of the Critical Philosophy; others were intended to subvert it, and to restore the old philosophy remodeled and established on sounder principles; and others again sought to find entirely new principles, on which to establish a more perfect philosophy than had ever before been dreamed of.

The chief aim of most of these systems was, to penetrate into the *terra incognita* of Kant, that is, into the region of *noumena* and of *supersensible things*. The authors were unwilling to believe we can know so little, as Kant had represented. They therefore attempted to rend the *vail*, which conceals the unknowable; or to bridge the *unpassable gulf* of Kant, which separates between phenomena and noumena in the material world, and between ideas and the objects of them in the world of thought.

One of the earliest of these projectors, was *Charles Leonard Reinhold*, a professor at Jena and Kiel, who died in 1823, at the age of 65. His theory appeared as early as 1789. It was,

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY LIBRARY

that *thinking* (Vorstellen), or the representing a thing to our own mind, gives us the desired objective knowledge. For our consciousness assures us, that in all *thinking* there are present three things, the *thinker*, the *thought*, and the *thinking*. The thinker is the *subject* of the action; the thinking is the *act* of the thinker; and the thought is the *product* of that act. Now in this product there is,—(1.) Something derived from the objects without the mind, and which is the matter or *material* of which the thought is composed:—(2.) Something derived from the mind itself, namely, the *form* of the thought:—and (3.) The *consciousness* that the material when shaped by the mind, does take that particular form.—But this theory was soon put down; and the author himself ingenuously abandoned it, when shown that it does not explain at all the *nature* of the matter of thought, but only the powers of the mind in the act of thinking.—This system was called *Vorstellungslehre*, the *Doctrine of Thought.*

A far wider and more durable popularity attended the speculations of JOHN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, a professor of Jena, who died in 1814, at the age of 52. At first he embraced the Critical Philosophy of Kant; but afterwards he thought he discovered a way to carry absolute

science into regions, of which Kant affirms, we can have no knowledge. His views were first published in 1794.

His system is entitled the *Doctrine of Science (Wissenschaftslehre);* and he describes it as being the Science, which establishes the possibility and the validity of all science. Such a preliminary science, he said, must rest on a single fundamental principle; and that principle must be so certain in itself as to need no proof from without, and so comprehensive as to embrace both the substance and the form of all scientific knowledge. And such a principle, be maintained, is found in the simple proposition I AM I. For, every thing *is, what it is;* neither less nor more. This self-evident truth may be expressed thus: A=A. Now by substituting the *I*, of which every one is conscious, in the place of A; and the verb of existence AM, of which also we are conscious, in place of the copula; we obtain the proposition I AM I; of which our consciousness, as often as we reflect upon our own mental acts, furnishes the *subject*, the *predicate*, and the *copula*. Of course, this proposition has apodictical certainty; for it rests on the ground of a perfect and known identity between the subject and the predicate.

Now by affirming this proposition, a *judgment* is expressed. But to *judge*, is to *act*. Here then is a *an act* of the *I*. The *I* directly affirms its own existence. It is the *actor*, and at the same time the *object* of its own action; and herein consists the *consciousness* which furnishes the knowledge of the proposition. But this act of the *I*, affirming itself to be *I*, and nothing more nor less, implies a stop, boundary, or limitation of the sphere of the *I:* in other words, it postulates the existence of something that limits the activity of the *I*, and confines it to its own sphere. Now this something which limits the *I*, whatever it may be, is certainly *not I*. And hence the proposition I AM I, proves the existence of *two* things or objects; namely, the *I* which is affirmed, and the *not I* which is postulated. It moreover proves, that these two objects limit or bound each other; so that neither of them, in so far as it is considered as bounded by the other, is infinite or unlimited, but is finite.

But what is this *not I*, which sets bounds to the *I*?—Manifestly it is something which owes its existence to the *I*. For the *I*, when reflecting upon itself and its operations, voluntarily or spontaneously limits and bounds itself; and thereby it gives up its claim to boundless existence and activity, and transfers a portion of ex-

istence and activity to the *not-I;* which is to the *I* the external world, or the universe without. This *not-I*, therefore, has no existence but what the *I* gives to it, by the act of limiting itself in the judgment, I AM I. Of course the world around us, or the universe, is only an *ideal* existence, a world of our own creation. We indeed conceive of it as real, when we consider it as limiting the *I:* but this limitation is of our own making; the *I* is the only real *actor*. And this holds true of all the individual objects, material or immaterial, which the mind contemplates as exterior to itself, and to which collectively she gives the appellation *not-I*. For the *I*, in all its actions, meets with obstructions, boundaries or limitations to its activity; and according to the variety in the obstructions or limitations, it forms numberless *conceptions* or *ideas* of supposed or postulated objects, which are endlessly varied, and which develop themselves continually in new and unexpected forms. The *conceptions*, so endlessly various, are the postulated objects, considered as limitations of the I. But as the *I*, in all cases, voluntarily limits itself, or gives being to the obstructions to its own activity, the *I* is the only *actor;* and the various conceptions of objects without, are only certain *forms* of the *activity* of the *I;* that is, they are all *ideal* existences.

We now come to the practical or moral part of Fichte's system. And here again, he takes the same proposition, I AM I, for his fundamental principle: and he also reasons from it in much the same manner. But he contemplates the *I* in a different character. In the first or theoretical part, he considered the *I* as a merely *intellectual* activity; here he contemplates it as a *free agent*, striving to accomplish objects or to attain ends.

In itself, and as limiting the *not-I*, the practical *I* is absolute and free, infinite, and the only real existence. And as a *free activity*, it is a *causality:* but in its *consciousness*, or when it affirms itself in the form I AM I, it always appears as something *finite*, something limited by a *not-I;* and its causality can manifest itself to the consciousness only as an *effort* to accomplish something; which *effort* is always obstructed and limited by the *not-I*. Hence the finite practical *I* contemplates itself as acted upon, limited, and restrained by a *not-I;* while the absolute practical *I* contemplates itself as acting upon, restraining, and limiting the *not-I*, and therefore feels itself to be free, unlimited in action, and the only real existence. But the *not-I* is a mere creature of the *I*, as we have before seen. And hence, the inert and lifeless *not-I*, by which the practical *I* is limited in its free activity is a mere

ideal existence. And thus we arrive at a knowledge of the *essential nature* both of the practical *I* and its opposing *not-I;* just as we previously ascertained the essential nature of the theoretical *I* and its opposing *not-I;* and in both, we find the *I* to be the only *actor*, and the only real existence, and the *not-I* to be a postulated *ideal* thing, which owes its existence entirely to the action of the *I.*

"After thus annihilating, by his idealism, the evidence of the objectivity of any sensible world, and leaving us only a system of empty images, (says Tennemann,) he labors to establish by means of conscience, a belief in the reality not only of a sensible world, but also of an intellectual world independent of it, and of a supersensible order in the latter world; and moreover, the possibility of acting for ends, which may be realized by such action. He commences with the idea of *freedom*, i. e. a universal and *absolute independence*, manifesting itself in the tendency of the *I*, from which originates the idea of independence. The principle of morals, therefore, or the *moral law*, (the law for free actions,) consists in the necessary *thought* or *purpose* of an intelligent being, to determine its free choice unconditionally, agreeably to the idea of independence; or, in popular language, to follow *con-*

science unconditionally. This determines what is *duty*. *Virtue* consists in being in perfect harmony with ourselves." (*Tennemann*, Grundriz, §. 395, p. 500.)

"But Fichte's *religious philosophy* attracted most notice. For he there asserts expressly, that GOD is the *moral order* of the world; and that to this conclusion the *I* is brought, by the consciousness that its free activity is bound by the idea of *duty*. For, by striving to realize duty, the *I* strives after a *moral order* in the world of its own creation; and thus it approximates to God, and has the life which comes from God. In this moral order of the world, *happiness* is the result of morality. But this happiness is not *perfect felicity;* which never ~~existed, and~~ never can. And thus all regard for *perfect felicity* is excluded. We need no other God than this order of the world; although we are prone to think of a particular *Being*, as the *Creator* of it: For, (1.) It is not possible to ascribe intelligence and personality to God, without making him a finite being like ourselves. (2.) To conceive of God as a particular *substance*, is *idolatry*, and militates with the very idea of him; because a *substance* is something which has a sensible existence in time and place. (3.) We can not ascribe *existence* to him, because

existence belongs only to objects of sense. (4.) There has never yet been brought forward any intelligible word, by which we can express the *creation* of the world by God. (5.) The expectation of *perfect felicity* (Gluckseligkeit), is a chimera; and a God supposed to produce it, is an *idol* ministering to our pleasure,—the prince of this world. These representations, brought forward in extravagant paradoxes and with great assurance, (but which Fichte himself abandoned afterwards,) were treated as real *atheism*; and they drew upon him very disagreeable consequences, which he did not altogether merit." (*Tennem.* p. 502.

"Fichte attempted, by various statements of his doctrine, to bring people to understand him, and he also changed his views on some points; as, among others in regard to the relation his system bears to the Critical Philosophy, (for at first, he maintained them to be in accordance,) and in regard to the way in which the original activity of the *I* is brought into consciousness, (for he first attempted it by the mere laws of thinking, but afterwards by an intellectual intuition). But the most striking difference between the more recent and the earlier form of his Doctrine of Science, is, that at first it was *idealism*, and afterwards *realism*. In the former, the

starting point was the activity of the *I;* in the latter, it is the *absolute existence of God*, as the only *real Being*, who is *self-existent* and *life itself*, and of whom the world and consciousness are a likeness or schema; and objective nature, he considered, as the absolute barrier or limitation of the divine activity. In producing this change in the Doctrine of Science, Schelling's philosophy, as well as Fichte's sense of religion, seems to have been operative. The Doctrine of Science excited great attention, and met with warm approbation and warm friends; and likewise with severe critics and strenuous opposers, especially among the Kanteans. And at last, it had the fate of every system: for, notwithstanding its imposing tone, (by which it greatly promoted an extravagant love of speculation, and contempt for real knowledge,) it could not gain the standing of a generally received philosophy. Yet it can not be denied, that Fichte's idealism had great influence on the spirit of his age; and, by the force of the author's peculiar eloquence, it fostered in many minds a strong predilection for the super-sensible." (*Tennem.* p. 505.)

CHAPTER X.

PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Schelling's Doctrine of Identity, Identitatslehre. *Fichte's* altered Doctrine of Science. Other Pantheists: *Bouterwek, Bardili, Eschenmayer, Wagner, Krause.*

The next system demanding our attention, is Schelling's *Doctrine of Identity, Identitatslehre;* so named, from its maintaining the perfect identity of the *knowledge* of things and the *things* themselves, or the entire coincidence of the ideal and real, the subjective and the objective. It is also called the doctrine of ALL-ONE, *Alleinheitslehre*, or *Alleinslehre:* because it maintains that the universe is God, and God the universe; or, that God developing himself in various forms, and according to general laws, is the only existence.

The distinguished author of this system, FRED. WM. JOS. VON SCHELLING, was born in 1775, studied at Tubingen till he passed Philos. Dr., then at Leipsic, and afterwards at Jena under Fichte. In 1802 he became M. D., and the next year a professor of philosophy at Wurtzburg: thence he removed to Munich in 1817, to Erlan-

gen in 1820, and back to Munich in 1827, where he probably still lives, an academician, a court-counsellor, and a professor of philosophy.—Schelling became an author at the age of 20, being then an admirer of Fichte's philosophy, from which he soon swerved; and at the age of 25, had published the ground-work of his new system, which he labored to perfect during a few years, and then turned his attention to other objects. For nearly 30 years he has published very little on philosophy: and his system has never been so fully and so lucidly explained, that the philosophizing public could perfectly understand it. And this, in the opinion of Krug, is one reason why his philosophy, which at first attracted so much notice and so many admirers, is now seldom mentioned in the German universities, and is sinking into oblivion.

The philosophy of Schelling depends less on logical demonstrations, than on bold assumptions claiming to be intellectual intuitions. Yet it does not disclaim all support from sound reasoning. A fundamental principle with the author, is, that the very idea of *philosophy* presupposes the possibility of a perfect and known coincidence between our *knowledge* of things and the *essential nature* of these things: because, it is only such a knowledge of things that can be justly called

philosophical or true knowledge. Then, without stopping to inquire, as Kant has done, how far such knowledge can extend, he goes on the supposition that there are no definable limits to it; and therefore his only inquiry is, *how* such knowledge may be supposed to originate; or, how can the fact be explained, that we have such knowledge.

Now, if the laws of nature were also the laws of human consciousness, or if the former were always exactly coincident with the latter, then our consciousness would contain an exact transcript, a perfect fac-simile, of what is taking place in the natural world around us, at least so far as our cognizance of things without extends. In other words, our minds would be *mirrors* reflecting perfect images of the things around us, and of all changes they undergo. And hence, by looking into our own minds we might there read the laws of nature, and learn perfectly the true nature of every thing that falls within the circle of our observation. Now this supposition so perfectly explains how philosophical knowledge is possible, and so pours broad daylight upon what was before dark and inexplicable, that we can not reasonably hesitate to adopt it as true. It is therefore to be assumed with confidence.

But still a difficulty remains; viz. How hap-

pens it, that these two mysterious streams (the course of nature in the objective world, and the course of human consciousness in the subjective or intellectual world,) should so perfectly agree, or be identical in all their meanderings? Our actual observations can not trace them back to their source, nor follow them down to their final termination; what then can explain the mystery of their entire coincidence? Answer: *Spinoza* has shown us, that there is only one *substance*, or one *real existence*, in the universe, namely GOD; who is continually developing himself, and by that development gives being to all that exists, whether material or immaterial. And here is a *key* to the mystery. The two streams flow from one and the same fountain, namely, GOD, as he existed anterior to his development. They are equally in their nature GOD, or the divine first principle of all things, who unfolds himself alike in both. They are therefore not *two*, but one and the same, in their essential nature, and of course also in the laws of their movement. We thus arrive at the source, the grand central point, from which all things radiate, and in which all contrarieties and diversities meet and coalesce: viz. the *Divine*, the *Absolute*, the *All-One*, in its primitive state or form. And all true philosophy must begin with a knowledge of this primal

All-One; and then, by tracing the developments of this *All-One* till it expands itself into the universe around us, a complete and perfect system of philosophy will be obtained.

This system, which Tennemann justly characterises as the *poetry* of the human mind, attempts to explain exactly the *process* by which the Absolute or the All-One gradually developed itself, till it became the now existing universe. But it would carry us too far to go over the whole process, and we therefore only subjoin the following general scheme of it.

I. The primitive form of the Absolute or All-One, (God), is that in which all contrarieties and diversities are completely merged and lost, and only an abstract identity of every thing can be apprehended.

II. This Absolute reveals itself in *nature;* which is the Absolute in the copy. And it reveals itself under two general forms or aspects; the one form is that of *real* existences, or things; the other form is that of *ideal* existences, or objects which exist only in the mind, and which can never be subjected to the senses. The objects belonging to each form possess different degrees or quantities of that essential nature which is common to them as a class; and this difference in degree or quantity is denoted by the

algebraic expressions for the powers of quantities, a^1, a^2, a^3. The *real* existences, or the proper things, are of three kinds or degress; viz.

1. (a^1) *The ponderous*, or mere matter.
2. (a^2) *The light*, or motion, power, force.
3. (a^3) *The living*, or organic beings.

The crown and complement of all these *real* existences, are (1) *Man*, the microcosm or world in miniature; and (2.) The external *Universe*, as a whole.

The *ideal* existences are also of three kinds or degress; viz.

1. (a^1) *Truth*, the subject of knowledge and ideas.
2. (a^2) *Goodness*, the subject of religion and feeling.
3. (a^3) *Beauty*, the subject of taste and the arts.

The crown and complement of the *ideal* existences, are (1) *Society;* and (2) the *History* of man or of the human race.

Schelling has devoted himself chiefly to the developments of the Absolute in nature, or to the *real* side of his system; and has only occasionally, and in general terms, explained his views of the *ideal* and moral side of his scheme. Respecting morals, he maintains that to *know God* is the foundation of all morality: and that

there can be no moral world, unless there is a God. *Virtue* is a state, in which the soul acts agreeably to the internal necessity of its nature, and not conformably to some law without. Morality is also *happiness;* for happiness is not a mere perquisite of virtue, but is virtue itself. The tendency of the soul to be in union with its center God, is morality. *Civil Society* is collective life conformed to the primitive divine image, so far as respects religion, science, and the arts. It is an exterior organization of a self-erected harmony in the department of freedom itself. *History* as a whole, is a gradually developing revelation of the Absolute or of God. *Beauty* is "the infinite represented as finite." *Art*, as an ability to represent ideas to the senses, is a clear perception of God by the mind.

Tennemann objects to this philosophy: (1) That it subverts all virtue and moral obligation, by subjecting every thing to blind fatality, or to a natural necessity; for God *must* develope himself; and whatever occurs, *must* occur, from the very laws of nature. There is therefore no freedom of action, and of course no virtue, and no morality, in any being whatever. (2) The system has no basis or foundation; for the *Absolute*, in which all things are said to originate, is a sheer *nothing*. Because an *absolute*, i. e. an

abstract Identity, without any relative Identity, or without any *things* which are *identical*, can have no existence. (3) The form of this system has only the appearance of being scientific. It exhibits no substantial proofs, no scientific deductions, but only positive assumptions and naked hypotheses. (4) It presumptuously claims to have a perfect knowledge of God; and it identifies him with external nature, and is so far *pantheism;* and moreover it subjects God to the higher conditions or laws of his nature, and therefore denies him all freedom of action. As a whole, it is rather the *poetry* than the *philosophy* of a reasoning mind.

The pantheistic principle of Spinoza, or the doctrine that God developes and expands himself into the existing universe, which Schelling thus revived and made the basis of his philosophy, was eagerly adopted by vast numbers in Germany; and many who did not follow Schelling's opinions on other points, embraced this doctrine as true, and as shedding much light on philosophy. Hence in different ways it was wrought into various new systems of philosophy, of which it was made to be an essential element.

Even FICHTE himself, when he found how abhorrent to public sentiment was his former doctrine, (namely that God is only the *moral order*

of the world,) did not hesitate to adopt Schelling's idea of an Absolute Existence, from which every thing finite is propagated or evolved.—From the year 1804, till his death in 1813, instead of maintaining, as he had done, that the *I* or the human mind is the only *real existence* in the universe, antecedent to which nothing real ever existed, and around and above which nothing real now exists, he acknowledged an eternal self-existing God to be the only and the living source of all being; and that He, by developing himself, gives *real* though not independent existence to all human minds. These finite human minds are still the *I* of philosophy; and as they are *divine* in their origin and nature, being a part of God himself, they are capable of understanding and knowing God, and of loving and serving him. As to the external world, or the *not-I*, it is altogether inanimate and lifeless; it is no part of the divine nature or essence, but is merely the abutting and bounding of the acts of God and of human minds, or the voluntary limitations which the acts affix to themselves; and therefore they are merely *ideal* things, the creations of the spontaneous activity of the living or real beings, viz. God and his progeny. Fichte therefore no longer made the *I* the sole foundation and source of all philosophy; but rather assumed a new foundation,

namely, the *idea of God*, of which the *I*, from its participation in the divine nature, is capable of an immediate and true knoweledge. But the general opinion of the learned was, that Fichte's new principle was entirely irreconcilable with all his former doctrines. And hence his attempt to improve his system and to render it more acceptable to the public, only tended to convince people that it had no solid foundation; and thus to induce his followers to leave his school, and seek for other guides in philosophy.

Professor Fred. Bouterwek, of Gottingen, likewise supposed that there is but one *real existence* in the universe; and that this absolute Existence pervades all things, and constitutes their *reality*. Whatever is *real*, or whatever truly exists, is a development of the Absolute, or of this one real Existence: all else is merely imaginary, or ideal, and destitute of objectivity. And therefore, to have any true objective knowledge of things, or to understand and know when our conceptions have objective reality, must be simply to apprehend the presence or the absence of the Absolute; that is, it is merely to perceive where the Absolute exists, and where there is only the deceptive appearance of its presence. But mere thinking and reasoning discursively on the

subject can never detect the presence of the Absolute; for all thinking and discursive reasoning have to assume it as already known. And hence reason must possess an absolute *power of knowing the real;* a power which neither thinks nor feels, but which is the foundation of all thinking and feeling on the subject. Entertaining these views, Professor Bouterwek published in 1799, what he called an *Apodictic*, or a demonstration of true knowedge; in which he maintained that the *human mind*, as itself partaking of the Absolute, has *immediate perception* or knowledge of the presence or absence of *reality* in the objects of its contemplation. But after a few years, recalling this opinion, he maintained that reason can have no immediate intuitions of the Absolute himself, or of his actual presence in objects; nevertheless, feeling her power to rise above mere sense, reason *confides* in her conclusions or judgments respecting the presence of the Absolute. He moreover asserted, that it is the proper business of philosophy to investigate this whole subject; and to ascertain definitely how far reason can go in detecting the presence or absence of the Absolute in objects, and where we must be contented with mere probabilities on this great question.

Professor C. G. Bardili, of Stutgard, brought

out in 1800 a new method of connecting the Absolute, or the *Original-One*, (*Ur-Eins*, as he denominated it,) with philosophy. This Original-One is the subject matter of all logical thinking: so that Logic is a *real* science, and the only true metaphysics. All logical *thinking*, moreover, is *computation* or reckoning, in the mathematical sense. That is, it is the perpetual repetition and involution of one and the same *unit*, the Original-One. But abstract thinking has reference to no definite object or finite being. It therefore does not afford us any objective knowledge, until we apply it to some definite object. It only shews us what is possible in the nature of things. But when we apply it to any definite object, then real or objective matter is brought into the process: and a judgment is formed of that object, by which the object is pronounced to be a *real* existence, or only a *possible* existence. This seems to be the amount of his obscure treatise, entitled the Elements of the first Logic, &c., which puzzled the brains of speculators for a time, and then was rejected as a baseless phantom.

Professor C. A. Eschenmayer, of Tubingen, at first agreed very well with Schelling; but in 1803, he departed essentially from him, by maintaining that the Absolute which reason intuits, is

not directly and immediately the Absolute himself, the primary source of all that exists; but is only an image or likeness of him. And hence philosophical knowledge is far more limited, than Schelling's theory supposes. The comprehensible and the explicable fall within the sphere of knowledge or philosophy; but the Absolute himself, and whatever is incomprehensible and inexplicable, belong to the sphere of *faith* or religion.

So also professor J. WAGNER, of Wurtzburg, left the ranks of Schelling's adherents in 1804, and has ever since philosophized in his own way. The Absolute himself, says Wagner, is no object of our direct knowledge: but the created universe is the living form of him; and the laws of the universe are the type by which he displays himself. Hence we must recognize him as existing beyond our ken, and as knowable only through the laws of nature. And as mathematics is the science which best investigates and defines the laws of nature, philosophy must depend chiefly on that science, in connexion with the history of man and the study of nature.

Professor C. C. F. KRAUSE, of Gottingen, coincided with the leading views of Eschenmayer, as above stated. He held the Absolute, or the *Original Being*, (*das Urwesen*, as he chose to call him,) to be the Eternal, far above both

the natural and the intellectual worlds, those two spheres into which the created universe divides itself; and yet he is the essential principle of both, pervading them and giving them life and being, though not discoverable by us. In his opinion, philosophy naturally divides itself into —(1) General Philosophy, or Ontology;—(2) Intellectual Philosophy;—(3) Philosophy of nature:—and (4) Synthetic Philosophy.

CHAPTER XI.

PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

Hegel's absolute Idealism: Logic the only Metaphysics.

The most famous and the most recent of the German pantheists who have attempted to improve upon Schelling, is Dr. Geo. Wm. Fred. Hegel, a professor at Berlin, who died in 1831, at the age of 61. He was born at Stuttgard, and educated at Tubingen, where he became intimate with Schelling, and adopted and for a time defended his philosophy. But at length, gradually deviating from Schelling, he set up a new school, which became very popular, and has of late altogether eclipsed that of his former friend.

Both maintained the identity of God and the universe, and the perfect coincidence between subjective and objective knowledge. But Hegel's was a system of absolute *idealism;* while Schelling's was rather a system of *realism.* For Schelling, like Spinoza, considered the original All-One as a real substance, which evolved itself into the existing universe: but Hegel considered mere *ideas* or conceptions, as the only real existences; he believed, that there is nothing in the

universe more substantial or more real than what he calls *concrete ideas* and conceptions. Again; Schelling supposed, that reason has direct *intuition* of the true nature of things, or of the objects existing around us and without us: but Hegel denied any such intuition of objects without; and maintained, that the mind only looks inward upon itself, its conceptions and ideas, and by analyzing them arrives at all philosophical knowledge. And hence, according to Hegel, a logical analysis of ideas and conceptions, is the only real metaphysics, or the true and proper science of *things*; and *Logic*, instead of being, what it has generally been regarded, a merely *formal* science, or one that treats only of the abstract forms of thought and the laws of correct reasoning, is really and truly a science of *things*, and the only source of true philosophical knowledge.

In accordance with these views, Hegel divides all philosophy into three parts; namely, the science of Logic, or philosophy in general; the philosophy of nature; and the philosophy of mind. The first part, called Logic, is the science of things in general, and corresponds with what is usually termed Ontology and pure Metaphysics. The second part, the philosophy of nature, treats of time and space, matter and motion,

material bodies and their properties, and of organic nature, geology, vegetables, and animals. The third part, the philosophy of mind, treats of the human soul and its faculties, of right and wrong, morality and duty, and of the arts, religion, and philosophy. Only the first part has been fully developed by the author, in his Science of Logic, in two vols. 8vo. first printed in 1812 and 1816. But he has given us a general treatise covering the whole ground in his Encyclopædia of the philosophical Sciences, in one vol. 8vo, first published in 1817, and again in 1827 and 1830. Both these works are now before me.

Hegel is the most unintelligible writer I ever read. Even the most acute German philosophers complain of his style, as being not only very harsh and dry, but so extremely obscure that they cannot fully understand him. Although abundantly warned on this point, I had the temerity to take up his Encyclopædia, and read it attentively from beginning to end, and some parts of it a second, a third, and even a fourth time, comparing it often with his Logic, vainly hoping to get some idea of that logical analysis which he tells us is the basis of all philosophy. But, after a fortnight's hard study, I was nearly as ignorant of the whole process, and

of every part of it, as when I first sat down to examine it. The most I could learn, was, that he commences with the idea of *entity* (*das Seyn*) in the abstract. He then tells us, that his second definition of entity, is, that it is *nothing* (*das Nichts*); and that the union of entity and nothing, or the transition of the one into the other, constitutes actual *existence* (*das Daseyn*); which, he says, may be illustrated by the verb *to become* (*werden*), as whatever *becomes* any thing, passes over from *not being* that thing, to *being* that thing. It may also be illustrated by the import of the noun *beginning* (*Anfang*), as *beginning* is a transition from non-existence to existence. After advancing thus far, I found myself in the midst of water so deep and so turbid, that I could neither reach nor see the bottom. Still I suffered him to carry me forward. When he had fully analyzed and explained, as he averred, all that is material in the idea of pure *entity*, he proceeded to analyze and explain the idea of *being* (*Wesen*), or *thing*, in the abstract; and then the ideas of *phenomenon*, and *actuality*, and lastly of *conception*, and *object*, and *ideas*. This closed the first part. On the philosophy of nature and of mind, he was equally obscure and incomprehensible: I could understand only here and there a detached thought.

As I am unable to comprehend his works myself, I can do nothing better than detail the opinions of others. I will therefore translate from KRUG, (Encyclop. Philosoph. Lexicon,) such parts of his statements as seem most deserving a place in these sketches.

In the body of his work, as printed in 1833, Krug thus writes: "Hegel was at first a true follower of Schelling, with whom he united in publishing a critical Journal of Philosophy, Tubing. 1802—3. In this period of his philosophizing also appeared his Tract on the difference between Fichte's system and that of Schelling. But he gradually separated himself from his master, and rejected in particular his doctrine of intellectual intuition, as being an unwarranted assumption. Yet he retained Schelling's fundamental idea, namely, the *oneness* of the subjective or ideal and of the objective or real; and in the idea of this oneness he searches for that absolute knowledge and absolute truth, to which, according to the demands of this school philosophizing must soar. Hence also, he maintained that pure *conception* in itself, is *entity*; and that real entity is nothing but pure conception. And this he does, without first demonstrating the unity of entity and conception, or, as it should be called, (since conception is only the product of the

thinking mind,) the oneness of entity and *thinking*. Equally arbitrary is his assertion, in a practical view, that whatever is rational is actual, and whatever is actual is also rational; a position, which may be considered as making moral precepts, viewed as demands of reason upon the will, altogether nugatory and superfluous, since the will *can* make nothing to be real, but what will thereby become rational. But the weakest part of Hegel's system is the æsthetical or the philosophy of art, and the theological or the philosophy of religion. And here, one who was formerly a very warm advocate of his system, but who on a better acquaintance with it cooled down considerably, (*Weisse*, in his Syst. of Æsthetics,) says, that Æsthetics and Theology begin, where Hegel leaves off; for, 'what we call ideas of the Beautiful and of God, Hegel recognizes only as to their psychological and historical apparition; that is, he considers them as phenomena, and the science of them as a part of the phenomenology of mind.' In short, Hegel seems not to have fully perfected his system. And as he was any thing rather than a master in the art of composition, and as his writings suffer as much from their obscurity as from a sort of dry harshness, it is scarcely possible to form a satisfactory judgment of his philosophy.

Those who profess to comprehend it, discover in it the consummated system of pure rational science. * * * * * * * Moreover, it is a striking fact, that among the numerous followers of Hegel, no one has hitherto been able to remove the obscurity, heaviness, and dryness of his mode of philosophizing, by a more clear, agreeable, and lively exhibition. All use the words, the phrases, and the turns of expression of their master; as if they were magic formulas, which would lose their power by the slightest change. *Jurare in verba magistri* seems to be no stranger in this school. Yet this renowned philosopher, who received special favor from the great, and thereby gained the more adherents, did not fail of opposers who assailed him with more or less ardor." After recounting various attacks upon Hegel's system, Krug proceeds: "It may here be asked, whether this school will be able to sustain itself long, against so many and certainly not inconsiderable opposers. To us it appears, this school no longer has internal union; and therefore it is not likely to escape dissolution, whatever may be done from without to bolster it up, on the false supposition that it is better suited than any other to sustain the existing order of things in church and state. Even the founder of it himself seems to have had some

presentiment of such a result. For, agreeably to a letter from Berlin, (inserted in a Periodical, Dec. 17, 1831,) which in general speaks favorably of Hegel, he said a little before he died, that he was anxious respecting the fate of his philosphy after his decease, because among all his disciples only one understood him, and that one misunderstood him."

In his supplemental volume, printed in 1838, Krug resumes his account of Hegel, thus; "The three principal parts of his system, are; *Logic*, as being the science of idea in itself (an sich); Philosophy of Nature, as being the science of idea in its secondary state (in ihrem Andersein); and Philosophy of Mind, as being the science of idea in its reversion from its secondary state into itself. Accordingly, there appears every where in this system a triplicity of subjects, together with their reconciling unity, in which they are all contained as momenta or elements. In this system the oneness of Entity and Conception is vindicated, on the ground of a supposed necessity inherent in Conception to move (develop) itself; and this it does, by a progressive *negation*; so that, e. g. Entity, by a negation of itself, passes into Existence; and God, by a negation of himself, passes into a World; &c. For God is *in self (an sich)*, and

must also be *for self (fur sich)*; in order to which, he must become *his second self (seinem Andern)*, and this is *Nature*, or the *World*. So in Hegel's Lectures on the Philos. of Religion, (published by Marheineke in 1832) this fundamental thought is variously drawn out, that God is the eternal, all-comprehending process of the absolute idea, which returns from the form of its secondary state (ihres Anderseins), its manifestation in nature, into itself, and, by means of human consciousness, attains to its individuality (ihrem Fursichsein) as Spirit. That this doctrine comes near to Pantheism, is not to be denied; notwithstanding Hegel and his school will not admit it, and by the use of biblical and religious phraseology—to which however they annex a new and professedly deeper and more occult meaning, they endeavor to give to their doctrine a coloring of orthodoxy. And hence *Eschenmayer* (in his Tract entitled, Hegel's religious philosophy compared with the principles of Christianity, p. 100,) passes the following judgment on this philosophy: 'It is nothing but a *Logic* vaunting itself in Christian verities.' And he goes on, perhaps with too much severity: "Hegel has a God without holiness, a Christ without free love, a Holy Ghost without illumination, a Gospel without faith, an Apostasy with-

out sin, Wickedness without conscious guilt, an Atonement without remission of sin, a Death without an offering, a religious Assembly without divine worship, a Release without imputation, Justice without a judge, Grace without redemption, Dogmatic Theology without a revelation, a this Side without a that side, an Immortality without a personal existence, a Christian Religion without Christianity, and in general, a Religion without religion.' And in an Article on Hegel's philosophy, (in the Allg. Kirchenzeit. 1836,) in which the religious and ecclesiastical part of this philosophy is particularly reviewed, the following severe judgment is pronounced: 'Hegel's philosophy is nothing *in itself* and *by itself*, nor was its author *in himself* but *beside himself*.' Compare also the Words of a Layman on the Hegelian-Straussian Christology. Zurich 1836, 8vo. No less unsatisfactory have the explorers of nature found Hegel's theory of the philosophy of nature. Thus *Link*, (in his Propylaen &c. vol. I. p. 46.) tells us, that Hegel's system, although framed with the greatest metaphysical acuteness, 'is of no value in the science of nature; indeed, it is painful to see what blunders Hegel makes, when he speaks on subjects of natural science, astronomy and mathematics. He is also so dictatorial and so bitter, that one

would laugh over him, if it were a laughable thing to see such a man so self-deceived.'"

After these remarks, Krug fills nearly three large 8vo pages with notices of the numerous works for and against Hegel's philosophy, which issued from the German press during about 12 years ending in 1837. After Hegel's death in 1831, his devoted followers and admirers, (chiefly young men, in and around Berlin,) resolutely met the assailants of his system, and exerted themselves strenuously to recommend it and give it currency. For this end they collected and published a voluminous edition of Hegel's Works, including his private letters, and his manuscripts and notes for Lectures, with elaborate prefaces and introductions. On the other hand, numerous adversaries, (and among them were many of the older and graver philosophers,) assailed the Hegelian philosophy in an uncompromising manner. They analyzed it, they confuted it, they ridiculed it, and held it up to scorn and contempt. The issue of the conflict, I have not the means of knowing.

CHAPTER XII.

INSTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY.

Instinctive Philosophy. *Jacobi's* Philosophy of Faith or Instinct. His followers: *Koeppen, von Weiller, Salat.* Ability and Honesty of the German Philosophers. *Schulze*, the only Skeptic among them.

We have now taken a brief view of most of those systems of German philosophy, which profess to give us a true and scientific knowledge of supersensible things; of which, Kant tells us, we can have no scientific knowledge. And we find, that all these systems end, either in absolute *Idealism*, or in what may be called *Pantheism*; that is, they either make all noumena and all supersensible things, together with their phenomena, to be nothing but *conceptions* and *ideas* existing in our own minds, and existing no where else; or they reduce all things to one primal substance, the All-One, or God, which develops itself according to certain laws inherent in its very nature, and thereby presents to us all the variety, beauty, and harmony of this great universe. And the latest and most renowned of these philosophers makes this primal All-One to be himself nothing but an idea or conception of the human mind.

Opposed to all these schools, and also to the Kantean school, was the celebrated Fred. Henry Jacobi, and a very respectable number of philosophers and divines who coincided with him in his general views. Of this school we now proceed to give some account.

Fred. Henry Jacobi, privy counselor to the king of Bavaria, and president of the royal academy of science at Munich, was distinguished as a fine writer, a poet, and a philosopher. He died at Munich in 1819, aged 76. Disgusted with the speculations of the philosophers around him, he assailed them all in their turn, yet with candor and discrimination. He was also more intent on overthrowing false systems, than on propagating a better one of his own devising. To Kant he awarded great merit, for successfully prostrating the delusive speculations of the former dogmatists, and for establishing on a firm basis a pure system of moral or practical philosophy. But he thought that Kant laid too much stress on the necessity of demonstration in order to true knowledge; for, by this error, he subverted all speculative knowledge of supersensible things, and then was unable to derive any satisfactory knowledge of them from practical reason. But the other schools, in his view, were still more erroneous. Their entire schemes were

fundamentally wrong, and when carried out, would necessarily lead to fatalism and to pantheism.

He supposed that there is a source of true rational knowledge, which these philosophers overlook. They reject all speculative knowledge, which can not be traced either to immediate rational intuitions, or to logical deductions from self-evident truths; thus making the intuitions of reason and the legitimate deductions from such intuitions the only sources of scientific or philosophical knowledge. But Jacobi supposed, that we have true knowledge *by faith* in the operations of our own faculties. This *faith*, he considers, as a rational *instinct*, a knowing from immediate *mental feeling*, a *direct perception* of the true and the supersensible, without any intervening proof; and of course, it is entirely different from what is ordinarily called faith, or a belief founded on testimony. And the *knowledge* based on this faith, is essentially different from speculative or scientific knowledge; which is generally only second-hand knowledge, or knowledge derived from intervening evidence or proof. According to Jacobi, there are two grand sources or inlets of knowledge to the human mind: first, *external sense*, by which we acquire a knowledge of the external world or of

material objects; and secondly, an *internal sense*, the organ of truth, (or, as he afterwards named it, *Reason*, the power of immediate knowledge,) by which we acquire a knowledge of God, of what is foreseen, of free agency, of immortality, of virtue, in a word of supersensible things. By this twofold revelation to him, (and Jacobi believed in no other divine revelation,) man is roused to self-consciousness, with a feeling of his elevation above blind nature, or of his free agency. He recognizes God, and his own free agency, immediately, by means of Reason. Moral doctrines also are capable of confirmation only by *feeling*. *Reason*, as being the faculty of *ideas*, which reveal themselves in our inmost feelings, gives to philosophy its subject matter; and the *Understanding*, as being the faculty of *conceptions*, gives to that subject matter its form. At least, so Jacobi expresses himself in his latest writings. Previously he did not explain himself with sufficient clearness, respecting that *faith* or internal revelation which he regarded as the foundation of philosophy; but left the point in considerable obscurity. And from this source, and from his not making a clear distinction between Reason and Understanding, and finally, from the fact that his theistic doctrine of faith and internal feeling was developed in a

loose and unsystematic manner, chiefly in opposition to others, various misapprehensions and objections originated. Still his merits, at least indirectly, in regard to the progress of philosophy among the Germans, are undeniable.—(*Tennem.* Grundritz, p. 531 &c.)

Jacobi's doctrine was well received, especially by those who place a higher value on faith and feeling than on the other manifestations of the mind. On the contrary, it was regarded as a subordinate mode of philosophizing by those, who give rational thinking a higher rank than feeling. But his want of clearness in discriminating between Reason and Understanding, seems to have led the cultivators of his philosophy to separate into two parties. For, some considered *ideas* as a divine revelation to the mind, through the medium of Reason; and they supposed the *conceptions* of the Understanding to have a negative relation to ideas, or that *ideas* can never be reached by *conceptions;* that *ideas* are incomprehensible and inexplicable, they manifest themselves in *feeling;* and, that *faith* precedes all scientific *knowledge.* But others allowed a wider sphere for conceptions. They considered philosophy as consisting in the union of Reason and Understanding, deriving its substance (Wesen) from the former, and its form

from the latter: and to this opinion, Jacobi, in his latter years, was most inclined. In the first party, *Frederic Koeppen* stands conspicuous; in the latter, *James Salat.* (Tennem. p. 533 &c.)

FREDERIC KOEPPEN, a friend and pupil of Jacobi, was born at Lubec in 1775, was first a preacher at Bremen, and then a professor of philosophy at Landshut, whence he removed to Munich in 1826, and afterwards to Erlangen, where he probably still lives. Once cordially attached to his paternal friend and guide, he has since become dissatisfied with Jacobi's philosophy, and now devotes himself to the study of the ancients, especially Plato. As a follower of Jacobi, he made *free agency* his starting point; as Jacobi himself did. *Free agency* is a self-determining, self-originating, and perfectly independent activity. It is therefore an *original cause*, the ground of all existence; it is *Being* properly so called. But it is absolutely incomprehensible; even its possibility can not be clearly perceived; nor its actual existence be demonstrated. It is an immediate matter of fact, in our knowing and acting. *Necessity* is an order of things established by free agency. The Divine activity is a perfect, absolute free agency. But the essence of humanity is, a combination of the internal and the external man; and of

course, man's free agency is limited. And hence philosophy is *dualistic*, reposing on both sense and reason. And from this dualism, arise the insurmountable contradictions of human science. And, we may add, (says *Tennemann*,) another legitimate consequence, namely, that on this ground, philosophy itself is impossible; and the problem, to establish it as a strict and proper science, falls of itself. Still, as Tennemann admits, the publication of Koeppen's views, as well as of Jacobi's, had a salutary influence on the philosophy of the day, in as much as they opposed the philosophy and the blind dogmatism of the schools, and exhibited in a lively manner many thoughts, either appropriately their own, or borrowed from Plato.

To this branch of Jacobi's school, belonged *Cajetan von Weiller*, a learned clergyman of the Romish church, secretary of the academy of science at Munich, and a distinguished writer, who died in 1826, aged 64. But he did not, like Jacobi, make *faith* or *feeling* the sole basis of philosophy; for he labored to discover for it some other and more intelligible grounds. He was likewise a believer in supernatural revelation; which Jacobi was not. To the same school belongs, *Christian Weiss*, born in 1774, first a professor of philosophy at Leipsic, and since, a school and

government counselor at Merseburg, a writer of considerable eminence. (*Krug*, and *Tennem.*)

JA. SALAT, a liberal Roman Catholic priest-born in 1766, professor at Munich, and afterwards at Landshut, where he still resides, a voluminous but inelegant writer, is a strenuous opposer of Romish bigotry, as well as of Schelling's and Hegel's philosophy. He takes a middle course between Kant and Jacobi, and founds philosophy on a *revelation* through the medium of Reason. That *objective* thing, which is to us the ground of philosophy, has two aspects; *first*, as being the subject matter of philosophy; and *secondly*, as being the foundation in us or the innate faculty for philosophizing. This native faculty, when suitably brought into action, develops itself in an *announcement* of the Divine, anterior to any subjective action of the mind. In consequence of this announcement, the mind recognizes the Divine, and eagerly seizes upon it. This announcement is no logical act of the mind, but is a realization of the Divine in the mind's deepest recesses; whence it proceeds forth from the will. If this announcement is apprehended by the mind, it is next to be comprehended, to be made intelligible, and to become something known: and this is what philosophy

accomplishes by the aid of Understanding. He considers Metaphysics as the whole of scientific philosophy; and Logic, Anthropology, and the Criticism of the intellectual powers, as only preparatory studies. There are three branches of philosophy, corresponding with the threefold relations of man; viz. moral philosophy, the philosophy of right, and the philosophy of religion. (*Krug*, and *Tenn.* p. 536)

We have now completed our survey of the various methods devised by Kant's successors, for passing that impracticable gulf, which, as Kant supposed, must ever separate between noumena and phenomena in the material world, and between the objective and the subjective in the spiritual world.

Before we take our leave of these acute but adventurous German philosophers, it seems pertinent to remark, that in general they appear to be, not only men of great learning and industry, but, what is more important, sincere and honest inquirers after truth, men who labor to discover a true and useful philosophy, a philosophy that will satisfy the wants of man as a rational and immortal being. And hence, though whole schools of them have landed in Idealism, and Pantheism; and though great numbers of them were rationalists or theists, disbelieving the divine

inspiration of the Bible; yet not a single individual, since the publication of Kant's Criticism, (so far as I know,) has professed either atheism or materialism, or advocated lax moral principles, or treated religion with levity or contempt, or denied a future state of rewards and punishments, or, in a word, showed himself a disbeliever in the great principles of natural religion. And only a solitary individual among them has professed to be a skeptic; and his skepticism was of a mild character, and was afterwards retracted or greatly modified. With some account of that individual, we shall close the present chapter.

Gottlob Ernst Schulze, (born in 1761, Dr. and prof. of philos. at Gottingen, and honorary member of the Philos. Acad. at Philadelphia in our country, died at Gottingen in 1833;) published in 1792 an anonymous work, in opposition to Reinhold's theory and to Kant's Critic, entitled: Æenesidemus; or, on the foundation of prof. Reinhold's Elemental Philoso; hy; together with a Defence of Skepticism, in regard to the pretensions of the Critic of Reason. This work professed to annihilate the illusions of imaginary knowledge, and to carry farther than Kant had done, the self-knowledge of Reason, by detecting the hereditary faults of all philosophy,

The result of the investigation was, that the *origin* of human knowledge is unknowable; and therefore, there can be no philosophy which shall explain it: that all that the schools tell us respecting the origin of knowledge, is mere play upon words without meaning; and that our curiosity should be limited to inquiries respecting the constituent parts of knowledge, the different kinds of it, and the laws by which conviction accompanies its several species. And this he called Skepticism, and likewise Antidogmatism, founded on the essential and necessary condition of the mind of man. This skepticism moreover, recognized the so called facts of consciousness; and it maintained, that the human mind, from its very constitution, is obliged to recognize these facts of consciousness as real, and to govern itself by them in practice. After farther inquiry Schulze narrowed down his skepticism still more; for, while he still denied the possibility of infallible criteria of truth, i. e. of the agreement of our knowledge with the essential nature of things, he did not divest the mind of ability, to discover how far our knowledge of particular objects is in harmony with the original constitution of the human mind, and to discriminate between such knowledge, and that which originates from our peculiar temperament or character as

individuals. At length, being fully convinced of the untenableness of skepticism, he attempted an investigation of the origin, the truth, the perfectibility, and the limits of human knowledge, according to the approved laws of natural science. His later views of philosophy approach near to the doctrines of Jacobi. He agrees with those who taking Plato for their pattern, regard Reason (distinct from the comparing faculty, the Understanding) as a source of knowledge of supersensible things, and who endeavor by means of it to solve the proper problems of philosophy. With his eye on those *feelings*, which distinguish men from brutes, he divides philosophy into four grand departments: viz. theoretical philosophy or metaphysics, explaining *religious feeling*; practical philosophy, explaining *moral feeling*; logic in the sense of the ancients, explaining *intellectual feeling*; and æsthetics, explaining the *feeling of the beautiful*. (*Krug*, and *Tennem.* p. 537 &c.)

CHAPTER XIII.

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.

The new school in France: its Origin, and Present State: its Advocates: its Doctrines.

As a conclusion to these sketches, we shall notice the part which France has taken in the modern developments of philosophy.

From near the times of Mr. Locke till quite recently, empiricism, and that of the grossest kind, has reigned undisturbed in France. About the middle of the last century, the abbe Condillac expounded the philosophy of Locke, omitting *reflection* as a distinct source of knowledge. Reflection, he said, can add nothing to the matter on which it reflects. It can only recognize, compare, generalize, and give form to the ideas which sensation presents. Of course, all our ideas in his view, are ideas of sensation, or in other words, *are sensations*. This became the reigning doctrine in France. The infidels, Voltaire, the encyclopædists, &c. all embraced it; and many of them deduced from it the materiality of the soul, atheism, fatalism, and sensuality as man's chief good. A few ecclesiastics and others feebly re-

sisted the tendencies of this philosophy; but without exposing or clearly discerning the unsound basis on which it rests. During the first years of the revolution, (1789—95,) all eyes were directed to the portentous occurrences of the day, and the only branch of philosophy much regarded, was political philosophy; and in that, man was considered merely as a reasoning animal, whose interests are all confined to the present life. Under the Directorial government, (1795—99,) the Institute and the Normal Schools called some attention to education, and required the study of philosophy on the principles of Condillac and the materialists. Under the Consular government, (1799—1804,) philosophy was more zealously pursued, but on the same general principles. Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy were the most distinguished writers on philosophy. Under the Imperial government, (1804—14,) a reformation in philosophy commenced, and it had made some progress before the restoration of the Bourbons. From that time onwards it has been steadily advancing, and it now has the weight of talent and influence on its side. The philosophers of the new school assume the name of *Eclectics;* and the name appears appropriate. We shall first notice the principal persons concerned in this reformation

of philosophy, and then attempt some description of their principles.

Peter Laromiguiere, born in 1757, first taught at Toulouse, and afterwards at Paris, where he was a member of the National Institute and a distinguished writer, till his death in 1837. He deviated considerably from Condillac; for he maintained that the soul is *active*, and not merely passive, in the acquisition of knowledge. Sensation indeed furnishes the materials for all our knowledge; but the mind gives form and shape to those materials. The activity of the mind is therefore a source of knowledge as well as sensation. The two are coordinate. Laromiguiere being a charming writer and a man of great acuteness, his doctrines spread far and were not without considerable influence.

Maine de Biran, who died at Paris in 1824, aged 58, obtained a prize from the Berlin Academy of Science in 1809, for the best essay on this question: Is there any immediate, internal [intellectual] *intuition;* and how does it differ from *sensible perception?* Cousin considered his works so valuable, that he undertook to edit them himself so late as 1834. De Biran was so opposed to the doctrines of the materialists, that he leaned towards universal idealism: whence Cousin compares him with the German Fichte.

He is said to have adopted Leibnitz's doctrine of Monads, with some alterations. He believed that all substances, or all real existences, are active powers or forces of some sort; that minds or souls have intelligence, volition, &c., while material substances have only motive force. He therefore clearly distinguished the soul from the body; and in examining the faculties and powers of the former, he commenced with consciousness.

John Peter Fred. Ancillon was born in 1766 at Berlin, where his father was minister of the Fr. Prot. church. He was himself preacher to the same church, then professor of philosophy in the military academy at Berlin, member of the Acad. of Sciences, counselor of state for foreign affairs, &c., and died in 1837. Ancillon wrote altogether in French; and he published various works on philosophical subjects, political, moral, &c.; in which he appeared pretty clearly to belong to the school of Jacobi. His works were read in France.

Peter Paul Royer-Collard, born in 1763, was first an advocate in the parliament of Paris, and then active but moderate in the revolution; afterwards, being made dean of the Faculty of Letters in the Normal School at Paris, he lectured on philosophy with great applause, from 1811

to 1814, when he returned to political life, and became head of the party called Doctrinaires, which took middle ground between the royalists and the ultra-republicans. In his lectures he brought forward Reid's doctrine of Common Sense, as an independent source of true knowledge, and urged it strenuously and successfully in opposition to the doctrine of Condillac.—This source of the knowledge of noumena and supersensible things, he called *natural induction;* and he described it as being a *spontaneous* and *necessary action of the mind.* His eloquence and his acute and powerful reasoning transfused this doctrine into nearly all his pupils; and thus laid the foundation for the new French school in philosophy. Yet only one of his lectures has been published entire, although many extracts from them have been given to the public, especially in Jouffroy's French edition of Reid's works, Paris 1828.

Victor Cousin, born in 1792, and educated under Royer-Collard, succeeded him in the Normal School in 1815, and carried forward the reformation in philosophy begun by his predecessor. In 1820 he was displaced, for his too liberal political opinions, and retired to Germany: but he returned in 1828, and resumed his lectures. His lectures for that year contain an In

troduction to the history of philosophy. These have been elegantly translated by H. G. Linberg, and were published at Boston in 1832. They contain the best exposition I have seen of his philosophical opinions. In 1829 he published a course of lectures in two volumes, on the philosophy of the 18th century. The first volume contains general views of philosophy and its history. The second volume contains an elaborate criticism on Mr. Locke's Essay, which has been well translated by the Rev. C. S. Henry, D. D. of New York. On the accession of Louis Philippe in 1830, Cousin was admitted into the French Academy; and the next year, he was sent by the king to examine the literary institutions of Germany, especially of Berlin, and make report. On his return in 1832, he was made a peer of France; and in 1804, minister of public instruction. He may be considered the corypheus of the eclectic or new school philosophers of France. But before we examine his philosophical doctrines, we will notice some others who have co-operated in the reformation of French philosophy.

The baron *de Massias*, for some time French consul general at Dantzic, and then charge d'affairs at Berlin, published various philosophical works, between 1821 and 1835; in which, it is

REESE LIBRARY

said, he seems to come near to Kantean principles; but he professes to differ from Kant, as well as from Royer-Collard and Reid. King could not exactly define his position; but tells us, he was ranked among the new eclectics of France.

The baron *Degerando*, born in 1772, and made a peer of France in 1837, the author of the Comparative Hist. of Philosophy, was a follower of Condillac in 1802; but when he published the 2d edit. of his history, in 1822—3, he accorded with Royer-Collard and Cousin, or was an eclectic.

Berard, who died in 1828, at the age of 35, published a work in 1823, in which he maintained the immateriality of the soul, and assailed the doctrines of the materialists openly and vigorously. And in the same year, Virey published a treatise on Vital Power, in which he takes the same ground.

Theodore Jouffroy, born in 1796, and now professor of philosophy in the Faculty of Literature at Paris, is an active member of the eclectic school. In 1828, he published Reid's works in French, with abstracts from Royer-Collard's lectures; and likewise Dug. Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Jouffroy devotes himself especially to Moral Philosophy; and he comes frequently before the public, in works which are

said to be creditable both to his head and his heart.

Philip Damiron, educated under Cousin, and now professor of philosophy in the college of Lonis le Grand at Paris, is the author of a history of philosophy in France in the 19th century, 2 vols., first published in 1828, and again in 1830. From this work, Krug and Dr. Henry appear to have derived most of their information respecting the recent history of French philosophy; and on them I am chiefly dependent. In 1831, Damiron commenced publishing a Course of Philosophy; of which four volumes had appeared in 1834, embracing Psychology and Morals. In his history, Damiron gives account of twenty-seven French philosophers of the 19th century; whom he divides into *three* classes: viz.

I. *Sensualists;* e. g. Azais, Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, Gall, Laromiguiere, Volney, &c.

II. *Theologists;* e. g. Ballanche, de Bonald, de Maistre, de la Mennais, &c.

III. *Eclectics;* e. g. Ancillon, Berard, Bonstettin, Cousin, Damiron, Degerando, Droz, Jouffroy, Keretray, Massias, Maine de Biran, Royer-Collard, Virey, &c.

The French philosophers of the new school appear to be ingenuous, liberal-minded, honest men; men who have no selfish or sinister views,

no vain ambition of applause, no pride of learning, in short, no other aim than to discover and to recommend the useful and the true, in a branch of knowledge long degraded and abused in their country by superficial and reckless men. They are harmonious in their efforts to raise philosophy in France to the rank of an honorable and useful science, by the careful study of foreign writers. Differing among themselves on various points, they are yet tolerant to each other, and assume the common sense of *Eclectics*. Indeed they appear not yet to have matured their thoughts. They all read the Scotch philosophers, Reid and Stewart, and some of them also Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, &c.; and from all these, as well as from Pluto, Aristotle, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, &c. they take what seems to them plausible, and too often, without due regard to the congruity or incongruity of that *syncretism* which they call eclecticism. At least, this appears to me to be true of Cousin, the present leader of the school. Dr. Henry has indeed exhibited a pretty coherent system, as being held and taught by Cousin. But he does not refer us to the works of the author for proofs; and as, with the three volumes of Cousin's lectures before me, I can not verify all his statements, and yet find in Cousin some dogmas and

positions which are not distinctly mentioned by Dr. Henry, instead of abridging the professor's statement, I will subjoin what I have been able to glean directly from Cousin. It should be recollected, that the works I consult are not precise and logical disquisitions, but loose popular lectures, and addressed also to a French audience, whose fancy must be pleased to secure their attention. Hence, not only is the language often popular rather than scientific, but in too many instances the reasoning also. Most of my references are to the Introduction to a Hist. of Philos. &c., translated by Linberg, Boston, 1833.

According to Cousin, philosophy is the science which strives to *comprehend* things, and to *account for* what takes place. It is the result of *reflection*, of the study of ideas and of thought; and its aim is, to advance all the great interests of man. It is one of man's most real wants. (p. 19—25, 51, 52, 367 &c.) Philosophy commences with *reflection*, with a critical examination of the human mind, or with what is called *psychology*. (p. 368 &c. 380, 390 &c.) From psychology it proceeds to logic, metaphysics, ontology, natural theology, cosmology, morality, &c. And its method or mode of proceeding is, to begin with observation and induction, or careful researches *a posteriori;* and then to introduce

analysis and deduction, or reasoning *a priori*. (p. 416 &c. 95—103.)

All the facts of psychology are found on the records of *consciousness;* and to these records we must go for a knowledge of them. It is by *reflection*, that we inspect that record, and learn those facts. (p. 147 &c. 152, 159, 161 &c. 193.) Cousin recognizes three faculties of the mind; viz. *sensibility*, or susceptibility of impressions from objects without; *volition* or the will, the source of voluntary action; and *reason* or intellect, the knowing, judging, reasoning faculty. On the first, (sensibility,) he says but little in this volume, and he seems to hold the common views of philosophers. Respecting the *will* or voluntary power, he is singular in maintaining that this faculty is the sole foundation of *personality*. The other faculties are not of a personal nature; they are common properties of our race; and they would operate in the same manner and with the same results, in all men, if they were not influenced in individuals, by the personal faculty or the will. (p. 125 &c. 128, 169, 175 &c.)

Reason, or intelligence, is nothing personal to us as individuals. There are not as many *reasons*, as there are *reasoning beings;* but there is *one eternal reason*, which is a sort of common property of all intelligent beings, and which

they all use at pleasure, according to their ability. The infinite God, who is intelligence itself, enjoys and uses it without any limitation; but finite beings can make only a limited use of it. (p. 125—129, 167, 171.)

Reason as a faculty of the human mind, operates in two ways; viz. *spontaneously*, or without the co-operation of the will; and *voluntarily*, or under the guidance of the will, as when we intentionally reflect, think, judge, &c. From its first mode of operation we derive all our primary knowledge, and all those general truths which seem to be innate or connate. This operation of reason is the Common Sense of Dr. Reid; and by Cousin it is denominated the *instinctive perception* of truth, the *instinct* of reason, *original perception*, and also *faith*, and *inspiration*. (p. 162—175, 193, 417; comp. his Hist. of Philos. II. 388—392.)

Reason, in both her modes of operation, is governed by *three* fundamental *laws* or first principles; which he calls the *elements* of reason and which occupy the same place in his system with the categories in the Kantean system: they give form, consistency and unity to all our knowledge. Moreover, as reason is not subjective or personal to us, but is universal, or the common property of all intelligent beings, and

is the same in man as in God; hence these laws or elements of reason are not merely the laws of *our* mode of thinking (as Kant erroneously maintained,) but they are the laws of all rational thinking, and the mode of God's viewing things; and of course they accord with the divine constitution of the universe, or with the real nature of things; that is, they have *objective* validity. They are the basis, not only of human logic, but of true metaphysics, and of a solid system of ontology. According to these fundamental laws of reason, whatever exists above us, around us, or within us, falls under one or the other of these *two categories;* viz. (1) the finite, the multiple, the particular, the limited, the dependent, the phenomenal, &c. or (2) the infinite, the one, the universal, the unlimited, the absolute, the substance &c. These are the two first categories or fundamental laws of reason. The *third* is the result of an analysis of the two preceeding. It is, that whatever exists under either of these categories, stands in *immediate relation* with its corresponding thing in the other category; so that neither can be conceived as existing, or as being possible, without the other. Moreover, all the things existing under the first category, (the finite, the multiple &c.) stand related to the corresponding things under the

second category as effects stand related to their causes; that is, the infinite is the cause of the finite, the one of the multiple, the universal of the particular, the unlimited of the limited, the absolute of the dependent, the substantial of the phenomenal, &c. And finally, by summing up separately all that exists under each of the two first categories, we have, as the sum total of the first, the world or nature; and as the sum total of the second, God the author of nature; and then this third category unites the two sums in a harmonious whole, which is the universe. (p. 108—131, 158—160, 418.) Cousin seems aware, that these views approximate so near to those of Schelling, that they may expose him to the charge of *pantheism;* a charge which he did not well know how to answer. (p. 132, 141—143, 147, 158, 233, 420.) Yet he did not intend to identify God with nature, or to teach that there is no God distinct from the world. (p. 16, 132, 143.) *Creation* he held to be a development of God's power, an act of his *will*; and in some sense a necessary act. (p. 136 &c. 142, 158.) It will also follow from these laws of reason, that God is as comprehensible by us, as any other object: and Cousin admits the inference. (p. 132, 133.) Indeed he is so far a Hegelian, as to believe that *ideas* represent existences, and not the

mere images or representatives of something else. (p. 21 &c. 123—125, 127, 129.) And he even tells us, that ideas constitute the nature of God. (p. 133, 134, 158, 165, 166.) Cousin holds firmly to the providence and moral government of God. He says: "God's perpetual agency, in respect to the world and to humanity, is providence." "The great deeds recorded in history, are the decrees of God's moral government of the world." (p. 224, 225.) And he distinctly avows himself to be a *Christian* philosopher. (p. 49, 57, 338, 339.) He says: "I believe that in Christianity all truths are contained; but these eternal truths may and ought to be approached, disengaged, and illustrated by philosophy. Truth has but one foundation; but truth assumes two forms, namely, mystery" [the form in which religion is presented to the mind in ordinances of worship, and in representations intended to excite devotion]" and scientific exposition: I revere the one, I am the organ and interpreter of the other."

CHAPTER XIV.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA.

Its Introduction. Coleridgeism.

The original design of these sketches, was, merely to give a general idea of the principal systems of German philosophy. This object was pursued through the twelve first Chapters. Another Chapter was added, on the new eclectic philosophy in France. And now, it is deemed expedient to annex some account of those schemes of modified German philosophy which have excited most attention in our own country; namely, the philosophy of *Coleridge*, as contained in his Aids to Reflection; the so called *Transcendental Philosophy*, contained in the Dial and other recent works published in Massachusetts; and the philosophic system of Dr. *Fred. A. Rauch*, contained in his Psychology.

Until within about twenty years, the empirical philosophy as taught by Locke and the Scotch writers, and which was described in the first Chapter of these sketches, had dominion in all our colleges and schools, and was regarded every where as the only true philosophy. Berkeley's

idealism was indeed received by a few; and, if it did not originate, it doubtless helped to give currency to, that species of pantheism which is fundamental in the theology of the Emmons school. Berkeley made immediate divine agency the sole cause of all the phenomena of the material world; and Emmons extended the same immediate agency throughout the intellectual world. But neither of these very acute reasoners aimed to overthrow the empirical mode of philosophizing. The first only wished to strengthen the argument from experience for the being of a God, and the second to reconcile the doctrines of Calvinism with a sound philosophy.

A little more than twenty years ago the German language, and with it, German literature and science began to be studied in this country; and soon, here and there an individual was induced to look with some favor on German philosophy. But the perfect novelty of its principles, and its strange terminology, rendered it almost unintelligible. Under these circumstances the writings of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who had mastered and adopted some of the fundamental principles of Kant, found their way into the country and were eagerly caught at and read by several of our younger theologians. His

Biographia Literaria, his work entitled The Friend, and his Aids to Reflection, found as warm admirers in this country as in England. In 1829, Pres. James Marsh, D.D. now a Professor in Burlington, Vt., published an American edition of the Aids to Reflection, with an elaborate Preliminary Essay vindicating and recommending the principles of the book. From that period Coleridgeism has spread very considerably in New England. The Biographia Literaria of Coleridge, and his Friend, which I read hastily soon after their publication, are not now at hand, and I shall therefore confine my remarks to his Aids to Reflection.

This work is not so much a treatise on philosophy, as a treatise on practical or experimental religion, and was intended especially for the use of young men who are studying for the ministry. Dr. Marsh well says: "It might rather be denominated *a philosophical statement and vindication of the distinctively spiritual and peculiar doctrines of the Christian system.*" Coleridge was one of the most evangelical men of his times in the English Episcopal church: and he supposed he could explain and establish in the most satisfactory manner the religious doctrines which he held in common with Abp. Leighton and other early Puritans, by means of those

principles of the Kantean philosophy which he had imbibed, and especially by means of what he calls *the momentous distinction between Reason and Understanding*. By means of this distinction, he thought he could establish more clearly and precisely the import of certain scriptural terms, such as carnal, fleshly, spiritual, the flesh, the spirit, &c.; and likewise "establish the distinct characters of Prudence, Morality, and Religion;" and finally, could shew the perfect harmony of "all the peculiar doctrines of the Christian faith" with reason or sound philosophy. (Aids &c., p. 62–64, ed. New York, 1840.)

But Coleridge was a poet: and poets seldom write well on metaphysical subjects. Besides, he has justly been pronounced a turgid and obscure writer: and although in his Aids to Reflection he aims at a more chastened and simple style than in his other prose writings, yet he has preposterously employed, in this purely didactic work, APHORISMS instead of logical definitions and fully developed arguments. He assumes that his readers know too much, or that they can understand him from a mere hint, a passing remark, a brilliant fragment of thought, without any full and clear delineation of his new theological views; and, like a genuine poet, he leaps

in medias res, and throws out his new and strange ideas, without preparing our minds to receive them, or even to understand them. Thus the all-important distinction between Reason and Understanding, which is the basis of his whole system, but of which nine tenths of the reading public have no clear idea, is every where held up to view as fundamental, and yet is no where described or defined. And his learned editor, catching too much of his spirit, says explicitly, (p. 46,): "What is the precise nature of the distinction between the understanding and reason, it is not my province, nor have I undertaken, to shew. My object is merely to illustrate its necessity." The consequence is, most readers of the book are utterly unable to comprehend it; and therefore, they strongly suspect the author was groping in darkness, or that he did not see clearly those shadowy objects which he would not venture to describe.

From the language and reasonings of Coleridge, as well as from his known partiality for German philosophy, it is presumable that he adopted substantially that distinction between reason and understanding which was described in the sixth Number of these sketches. There, however, we had especially in view the distinction between what is called *theoretical* or *specu-*

lative Reason, and the Understanding considered as an intellectual faculty: but Coleridge is principally concerned with *practical* Reason, or Reason in its relation to the Will and to the moral actions of man; in which relation, Coleridge says, it is "the determinant of ultimate ends," that is, it is the source of those pure ideas of right, of duty, of moral obligation, which should be the supreme law of action to a rational being. In distinction from this faculty, the Understanding considered as a principle of action, bears a striking resemblance to the Instinct of the more intelligent animals, the ant, the bee, the beaver, &c. It is the ability to select and apply fit means to proximate ends. Its views are limited to the object in immediate contemplation; and it is but another name for ingenuity, sagacity, practical judgment in affairs, or the power of judging according to the maxims of experience. (See Aids, &c., page 241, note; and page 353.) Coleridge often calls it "the faculty of judging according to sense;" that is according to empirical wisdom.

Now man, according to Coleridge, was endowed by his Creator with the faculties of Understanding and Reason, which he was to develope and employ in the fulfillment of his duties as a creature of God. His Understanding was

to supply in him the place of Instinct in the brutes; speculative Reason was to enable him to cultivate scientific knowledge; and practical Reason was to regulate and govern his moral conduct, or to enable him to yield rational obedience to the laws of his Creator. But by the apostacy, in which all participate as soon as they become capable of moral action, the Will of man divorces itself from practical Reason, and submits to the control of the Understanding and the natural propensities. By so doing, fallen man turns away from those high and pure principles of right, of duty, of moral obligation, which should be his ultimate aims, and fixes his regards on proximate ends, or in the language of an apostle, on "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life." He practically, if not also theoretically, discards the idea of there being any thing higher or more excellent than personal enjoyment or individual happiness: and in determining what will make him happy, or what is his supreme good, he recurs to experience as the best and the proper criterion. Thus, by following his Understanding as his only guide, fallen man is selfish and earthly-minded, until, by the new birth, practical Reason is restored to her throne in the soul.

But for the full understanding of this subject,

the wide difference between *nature* and *free Will* must not be overlooked: for, as Dr. Marsh says: "The key to his system will be found in the distinctions which he makes and illustrates between nature and free Will, and between the Understanding and Reason." (See Aids, &c., p. 17.) ——Throughout the kingdom of *nature* according to Coleridge, one universal law prevails, and has absolute control. It is, that of the *necessary dependence* of one thing on another, or the *law of cause and effect.* To this law not only all material bodies, but all vegetable and animal life, and all the sensitive and elective faculties both of brutes and of man's animal nature, are entirely subject. But the *free Will* of a rational being, in his opinion, is not subject to this law. It acts spontaneously, and independently of any causation from without. It is not controlled by *motives* as the proper causes of its elections: "The man makes the motive, and not the motive the man." (p. 106.) Now when the Will renounces its allegiance to practical Reason and subjects itself to the guidance of the Understanding and the natural propensities, it renounces its high and spiritual character, and consents to become as it were a part of nature; and thus the whole man becomes carnal, earthly, selfish, and scarcely superior to the brutes, so far as the discharge

of his duties and obligations as a creature of God is concerned. And this is the radical principle of sin or depravity in fallen man, or what the scriptures denominate the flesh, the carnal mind, and the minding the things of the flesh. And consequently, the recovery of man from this sinful state, is, making him spiritual or spiritually minded; it is exciting his debased and degraded Will to renounce its subjection to sense and to the Understanding, and be obedient to the commands of practical Reason, or to the law of right, of duty, of moral obligation. Now both scripture and experience show, that when the Will has been long enslaved to sense, its energies are paralyzed, and divine aid or supernatural grace is necessary to restore it to sound and healthy action. Besides, the guilt incurred by a course of criminal disobedience to the law of God, presents an additional obstacle to the restoration of the sinner to the favorable regards of his Creator. And hence the necessity of a divine Redeemer for fallen man, a Redeemer who can act both *on* and *in* the Will, and can stand up as a Mediator between God and sinful man. (See Aids, &c., p. 297, &c.)

Coleridge has moreover taken much pains to ascertain the precise import of the terms prudence, morality, and spiritual religion. *Prudence*,

he says, has for its chief organs the senses and the understanding. Its sole aim is the advancement of our personal interest or happiness; and it is especially careful to guard against every thing that may do us harm, frustrate our plans, or mar our happiness. *Morality* has for its chief organ the heart, or the natural affections and sympathies of our nature; and it seeks the happiness of others, because we find pleasure in doing so. *Spiritual religion* has for its organs free Will and practical Reason; and its sole aim is to make the whole conduct of the man to harmonize with the divine law. From these definitions, it is manifest that a man may have and may exhibit much prudence and much morality, and yet be entirely destitute of spiritual religion.

Such, according to Coleridge, are some of the radical principles of mental philosophy; and they are of very high importance to the right understanding and the vindication of the peculiar doctrines and precepts of Christianity. They give us clear and just conceptions of the apostacy of man, of both original and actual sin, of that carnal mind which is enmity against God, because it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be; and hence also, of that redemption which is by Jesus Christ, of regeneration by

divine grace, and of that holiness without which no man shall see the Lord. Not that this philosophy, or any other, is competent to teach us originally all the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, or to demonstrate their truth, without the aid of revelation. But when these momentous truths are revealed to us, this philosophy enables us to comprehend them, and to see that they are reasonable, and are worthy of all acceptation as coming from God.

CHAPTER XV.

AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM.

Propriety of the Name. Its Origin. Its Radical Principles.

THAT species of German Philosophy which has sprung up among the Unitarian Clergy of Massachusetts, and which is advocated especially in a recent periodical called the Dial, is known by the appellation TRANSCENDENTALISM. The propriety however of the appellation, may be questioned. KANT, who, so far as I know, first brought the term Transcendental into philosophy, would certainly not apply it to this or to any similar system. He would denominate it TRANSCENDENT, not Transcendental. The difference, according to his views, is immense. Both terms indeed denote the *surpassing* or transcending of certain limits; but the limits surpassed are entirely different. That is called *Transcendental*, which surpasses the limits of sensible or empirical knowledge and expatiates in the region of pure thought or absolute science. It is therefore truly scientific; and it serves to explain empirical truths, so far as they are explicable. On the other hand, that is called *Transcendent*, which

not only goes beyond empiricism, but surpasses the boundaries of human knowledge. It expatiates in the shadowy region of imaginary truth. It is, therefore, falsely called science: it is the opposite of true philosophy. A balloon sent up by a besieging army to overlook the ramparts of a fortification, if moored by cables, whereby its elevation, its movements, and its safe return into camp are secured, is a *transcendental* thing; but if cut loose from its moorings and left to the mercy of the winds, it is *transcendent;* it has no connection with any thing stable, no regulator; it rises or descends, moves this way or that way, at hap-hazard, and it will land, no one knows where or when. Now, according to the Critical Philosophy, all speculations in physical science that attempt to go beyond phenomena, and all speculations on supersensible things which attempt to explain their essential nature, are *transcendent;* that is, they overleap the boundaries of human knowledge. In violation of these canons, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel plunged headlong into such speculations, and yet called them Transcendental; and the new German Philosophers of Massachusetts follow their example.

Waiving however this misnomer,—as every real Kantian must regard it, we will call this philosophy *Transcendental;* since its advocates

choose to call it so, and seeing the name has become current in our country. And we will first inquire into its origin among us, and then proceed to notice its prominent characteristics.

Origin of Transcendentalism among us.

According to their own representations, the believers in this philosophy are Unitarian clergymen, who had for some time been dissatisfied with the Unitarian system of theology. They tell us, they found it to be a meagre, uninteresting system, which did not meet the religious wants of the community. While laboring to improve their system of theology, or to find a better, they cast their eyes on foreign countries. There they discovered a different philosophy prevailing; a philosophy which gives an entirely new version to Christianity, invests it with a more spiritual character, with more power to move the soul, to call forth warm emotions, and to produce communion with God. This philosophy they have now embraced. Such, they inform us, was the origin of Transcendentalism among them.— But it may be more satisfactory to give their own statements on this head.

The Rev. G. Ripley, or whoever composed the long anonymous letter to Prof. Norton, on his Discourse before the Alumni of the Cam-

bridge Theological School, in 1839, says (pages 11, 12): "In our happy state of society, as there is no broad line of distinction between the clergy and the rest of the community, they [the Alumni] had shared in the influences, which, within the last few years, have acted so strongly on the public mind: with intelligent and reflecting men of every pursuit and persuasion, many of them had been led to feel the *necessity* of a more thorough *reform in theology:* they were not satisfied that the denial of the Trinity and its kindred doctrines gave them possession of all spiritual truth: they wished to press forward in the course which they had begun, to ascend to higher views, to gain a deeper insight into Christianity, to imbibe more fully its divine spirit, and to apply the truths of revelation to the wants of society and the progress of man. Their experience as pastors had brought them into contact with a great variety of minds; some of which were dissatisfied with the traditions they had been taught; the religion of the day seemed *too cold, too lifeless, too mechanical* for many of their flock; they were called to settle difficulties in theology of which they had not been advised in the school; objections were presented by men of discernment and acuteness, which could not be set aside by the learning of books;

it was discovered that many had become unable to rest their religious faith on the foundation of a *material philosophy*, [viz. the empirical philosophy of Locke;] and that a new direction must be given to their ideas, or they would be lost to Christianity, and possibly to virtue. The wants of such minds could not be concealed," &c. . . . . "In the course of the inquiries which they had entered into, for their own satisfaction and the good of their people, they had become convinced of the superiority of the testimony of the *soul* to the evidence of the *external senses;* the essential character of Christianity, as a principle of *spiritual faith*, of reliance on the Universal Father," &c.

The Rev. O. A. Brownson, in his Charles Elwood, (Boston, 1840, p. 261,) says: "It can not have escaped general observation, that religion, for some time, has failed to exert that influence over the mind and the heart that it should. There is not much open skepticism, not much avowed infidelity, but there is a vast amount of *concealed doubt*, and *untold difficulty*. Few, very few among us but ask for more certain evidence of the Christian faith than they possess. Many, many are the confessions to this effect, which I have received from men and women whose religious character stands fair in the eyes of the

church. I have been told by men of unquestionable piety, that the only means they have to maintain their belief even in God, is never to suffer themselves to inquire into the grounds of that belief. The moment they ask for proofs, they say, they begin to doubt. Our churches are but partially filled, and the majority of those who attend them complain that they are not fed."——"Surely, then, it is time to turn Christianity over and see if it have not a side which we have not hitherto observed. Perhaps when we come to see it on another side, in a new light it will appear unto us more beautiful and have greater power to attract our love and reverence."

The Rev. R. W. EMERSON, in his Address to the Senior Theological Class, at Cambridge, in 1838, says, (page 17,) "It is my duty to say to you, that the *need was never greater of a new revelation* than now. From the views I have already expressed, you will infer the sad conviction, which I have, I believe, with numbers, of the *universal decay* and now *almost death* of faith in society. The soul is not preached. The church seems to *totter to its fall*, almost all life extinct." Again, (page 24,) he says: "I think no man can go with his thoughts about him, into one of our churches, without feeling that what hold the public worship once had on men, is gone

or going. It has lost its grasp on the affection of the good, and the fear of the bad. In the country neighborhoods, half parishes are *signing off*,—to use the local term." . . . . And (on page 21,) he says: "The *prayers* and even the *dogmas* of our church, are like the zodiac of Denderah, and the astronomical instruments of the Hindoos, wholly insulated from any thing now extant in the life and business of the people. They mark the height to which the waters once rose."

For the perfect accuracy of these statements, I cannot vouch from my own personal knowledge. Nor are they here adduced to prove the actual state of the Unitarian congregations, but simply to show how defective the Transcendentalists consider the Unitarian theology, and of course, the grounds of *their* dissatisfaction with it.

The author of an elaborate and highly interesting article in the Dial for April 1841, entitled the Unitarian Movement in New England, has given a very philosophical account of the origin of the Unitarian community in this country, as well as of the recent rise of the sect of Transcendentalists in that community. According to this able writer, the doctrine of the Trinity, and the connected doctrines of man's deep-rooted

depravity, and his dependence on divine grace for a recovery to holiness and happiness, will admit of a satisfactory explanation and vindication, only on the principles of the Platonic, or (as we have called it) the metaphysical philosophy. On the principles of the sensuous or empirical philosophy, as he supposes, a Trinity in the Godhead is an absurdity, and the connected doctrines mysterious and inexplicable. But, as is well known, from the days of Locke this latter philosophy held the ascendency; or rather, it was, until quite recently, the only philosophy known in the country. While addicted to such a philosophy, our theologians could not reason closely on the articles of their faith, without meeting with difficulties and perplexities: and they were in great danger of falling into different opinions respecting the Christian doctrines. At the same time, the orthodox creeds forbade any deviation from the established faith. The result was, that those most given to free inquiry, fell into Unitarianism, and the doctrines connected with that system. Thus originated, according to this writer, the Unitarian movement in New England: for he says expressly, (page 431,) "We regard it [Unitarianism,] as the result of an attempt to explain Christianity by the sensual philosophy, instigated by a desire to get rid of

mystery, and to make every thing clear and simple."

The proximate causes of the rise of Transcendentalism among the Unitarians, are thus described by this writer, (page 422—3): "The Unitarian movement disenthralled the minds of men, and bade them wander wheresoever they might list in search of truth, and to rest in whatsoever views their own consciences might approve. The attention of our students was then called to the literature of foreign countries.—They wished to see how went the battle against sin and error there. They soon found a different philosophy in vogue, and one which seemed to explain the facts of their own experience and observation more to their satisfaction, than the one they had been accustomed to meet in their books. In most cases the pleasure of the discovery was heightened by the fact, that these men, in their previous inquiries, had come to the same or similar conclusions. In some cases they had been too diffident to express them, while in others the expression of them had called forth manifest indications of disapprobation, if not of open persecution."——The concluding sentences in this quotation shew, that the Transcendentalists, before they became acquainted with foreign philosophy, were not satisfied with

the Unitarian system of theology; and that some of them had, at that time, arrived at nearly their present theological views, the expressions of which then met the disapprobation, if not the open persecution of the staunch Unitarians.—The inconsistency of the Unitarian body in advocating unlimited freedom of inquiry, and then censuring the Transcendentalists for practising it, is severely rebuked in the following passage, (page 434,) "They have made a great movement in favor of freedom of inquiry, and thoroughness and fearlessness of investigation; and now, like the witch of Endor, they seem terrified at the spirit they have called up. This would seem to indicate that the movement in favor of freedom and liberty was not the offspring of pure, disinterested love of truth and principle."

The defects of the Unitarian theology are described by this able writer, in the following terms, (page 436,) "Unitarians make Christianity too plain, plainer than from the very nature of the case it can possibly be."——"There is, moreover, a degree of religious experience that Unitarianism fails to satisfy." [Page 438]: "Unitarianism is sound, sober, good sense. But the moment a preacher rises to eloquence he rises out of his system." [Page 440]: "We think

that in its principles and logical tendency, it is *allied* to the most barren of all systems."

Characteristics of the Transcendental Philosophy.

None of the Transcendentalists of this country are Philosophers by profession. Nearly all of them are clergymen, of the Unitarian school; and their habits of thought, their feelings, and their aims, are manifestly theological. Nor do they give us proof that they have devoted very great attention to philosophy as a science. They have produced, I believe, no work professedly on the subject, not even an elementary treatise; and, if I do not mistake, they have brought forward no new views or principles in philosophy. So far as I can judge, they have merely taken up the philosophy of Victor Cousin, and, after comparing it according to their opportunity with that of the more recent German schools, have modified a little some of its dicta, and applied them freely to scientific and practical theology. At the same time they take little pains, to elucidate and explain the principles of their new philosophy. They address us, as if we all read and understood their favorite Cousin, and were not ignorant of the speculations of the German pantheists: and their chief aim seems to be, to shew

us how much better this Gallo-Germanic philosophy explains the religion of nature and of the bible, than the old philosophy of Locke and the Scottish school. Whoever, therefore, would understand the Transcendental writers, must first understand, if he can, the French philosopher Cousin and the German pantheists.

The philosophy of Cousin, as well as that of the modern Germans, we have attempted to describe very briefly, in the preceding chapters; and to them the reader is referred.

Cousin maintains that, by taking a higher point of observation, he has brought all previous systems of philosophy to harmonize with each other. [See his Introd. to Hist. of Phil. by Linberg, page 414.] He therefore adopts, and uses at pleasure, the peculiar phraseology of all the systems, as being all suited to express his own new views. This causes his writings to exhibit, not only great variety, but apparently, if not really, great inconsistency of terminology. And hence different persons, aiming to follow him as a guide, may easily mistake his meaning, and adopt different principles; or, if they adopt the same principles, they may express themselves in a very different manner. And, if we suppose the same persons, with only a moderate share of philosophic learning and philosophic tact, to

attempt to re-construct the philosophy of Cousin, by comparing it with the German systems from which it is taken, and at the same time to adopt Cousin's lax use of language; we may easily conceive, what confusion of thought and obscurity of statement may appear on their pages. Now the Transcendentalists, if I do not mistake, have thus followed Cousin. Of course, they differ considerably from one another; some following Cousin more closely, and others leaning more towards some German; some preferring one set of Cousin's terms, and others another, or coining new ones to suit their fancy. After all, Linberg's translation of Cousin's Introduction to the History of Philosophy may be considered as the great store house, from which most of them—e. g. Brownson, Emerson, Parker, &c. —have derived their peculiar philosophical opinions, their modes of reasoning, and their forms of thought and expression.

The radical principle of the Transcendental philosophy, the corner stone of the whole edifice, is, Cousin's doctrine that *Spontaneous Reason* acquaints us with the true and essential nature of things. According to this doctrine, Reason, when uncontrolled by the Will, or when left free to expatiate undirected and uninfluenced by the voluntary faculty, always apprehends things as

they are, or has direct and absolute knowledge of the objects of its contemplation. This *clairvoyance* of Reason, Cousin calls "an instinctive perception of truth, an entirely instinctive development of thought,"——"an original, irresistible, and unreflective perception of truth," "pure apperception, and spontaneous faith,"—"the absolute affirmation of truth, without reflection,—inspiration,—veritable revelation."—[Introd. &c. pages 163, 167, 172, 166.] The characteristics of this kind of knowledge, as being *immediate*, and *infallible*, though not always perfectly distinct at first, and as being *divine*, or as coming from God either directly or indirectly, all Transcendentalists maintain. But in what manner, or by what mode of action, our Reason acquires this knowledge, they do not distinctly inform us. Whether our Creator has endowed us with an intellectual *instinct*, a power of rational intuition; or whether the rational soul, as itself partaking of the divine nature, has this *inherent sagacity* in and of itself; or whether the divine Being, God himself, is always present in the soul and acting in it by way of *inspiration*, these philosophers seem not to have decided. They use terms, however, which fairly imply each and all of these hypotheses, and especially the last. But however undecided

on this point, which is of so much importance in a philosophic view, on the general fact that all rational beings do possess this knowledge, they are very explicit; and some of them attempt to prove it, by reasoning from the necessity of such knowledge to us, and from the current belief of mankind. [See Cousin's Psychology, Chap. vi. and a writer in the Dial, vol. ii. page 86, &c.]

The effects of this principle, when carried into theology, are immense. It dispels all mysteries and all obscurities from this most profound of all sciences, and gives to human Reason absolute dominion over it. For, it makes the divine Being, his government and laws, and our relations to him, and all our religious obligations and interests,—every part of theology, theoretical or practical,—perfectly comprehensible to our Reason in its spontaneous operation. It makes all the doctrines of *natural religion* the objects of our direct, intuitive knowledge: we need no explanations and no confirmations from any books or teachers; we have only to listen to the voice of spontaneous Reason, or to the teachings of our own souls, the light that shines within us, and all will be perfectly intelligible and absolutely certain. And hence, we need no *external revelation*, no inspired teacher, to solve our doubts and difficulties, or to make any part of

natural religion, or any principle of moral duty, either more plain or more certain. We are, all of us, prophets of God, all inspired through our Reason, and we need no one to instruct and enlighten us. The great Seers of ancient times, Moses and the prophets, Christ and the apostles, were no otherwise inspired than we all are; they only cultivated and listened to spontaneous Reason more than ordinary men; and this enabled them to see further and to speak and write better than other men on religious subjects. If we would determine whether the *bible* was written by inspired men, we need not pore upon the so called external evidences, miracles, prophecies, &c. but merely listen to the testimony of our own souls, the teachings of spontaneous Reason, or what is called the internal evidence, and we shall at once see the clear and infallible marks of inspiration. And *to understand the bible*, we need no aid from learned interpreters. Only give us the book in a language we can read, and the suggestions of our own inspired minds will enable us to comprehend perfectly the import of every sentence, and to see clearly what is divine and what is human, or what originated from spontaneous Reason and what from human infirmity, in the holy scriptures. And of course, every man is competent to decide, definitely and

infallibly, all the controversies among theologians and all the disputes between different sects of Christians, respecting the *doctrines taught in the bible.* In short, not only the profound researches of philologists, antiquarians, and biblical commentators, but also the elaborate discussions of didactic theologians, polemic, apologetic, and metaphysical, are all of little or no value in theology. Instead of depending on them, the theological inquirer should rather retire to solitude and silence, and while musing on religious subjects, with the bible and the book of nature before him, he should refrain from giving any determinate direction to his thoughts, and allowing them to flow on spontaneously, he should listen to the voice of Reason as she expatiates freely in the open field of visions; then he will be caught up, as it were, to the third heaven, and will see all that the inspired prophets saw; his knowledge will be superhuman and divine.

But to understand more fully the metaphysics of the Transcendental writers, we must not overlook their *ontological* doctrines. If Reason acquaints us with the true and essential nature of all things, then the field of ontology is open fully to our inspection, and we may form there a perfectly solid and safe science. Accordingly, all Transcendentalists, on both sides of the Atlantic,

assume some system of ontology as the basis of their speculations. The prevailing system among the modern Germans, and that to which Cousin and his American followers assent, is *pantheistic:* that is, it resolves the universe into one primordial Being, who develops himself in various finite forms: in other words, it supposes God and the developments of God, to be the only real existences, the το παν, the entire universe. But when they attempt to explain this general statement, the Germans bring forward different hypotheses. Some, following *Spinoza*, invest the primordial Being with the essential attributes of both a substance and a person; and they suppose him to create from himself, or to form out of his own substance, all rational and sentient beings and all material things. Others, with *Schelling*, suppose him to be originally neither a person nor a substance, but the elementary principle of both, which, in developing itself, becomes first a person and a substance, and then a universe of beings and things. Others follow *Hegel*, and adopt a system of pure *idealism.* They suppose concrete ideas to be the only real existences, and the logical genesis of ideas to be the physical genesis of the universe. Take the simple idea of existence, and abstract from it every thing con-

REESE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

ceivable, so that it shall become evanescent; and in that evanescent state, while fluctuating between something and nothing, it is the primitive, the generative principle of all things. For it is the most comprehensive or generical of all ideas, including all other ideas under it as subordinate genera and species; and therefore, when expanded or drawn out into the subordinate genera and species, it becomes the το παν, the universe of beings and things. Vacillating among all these theories, especially between the two last, and trying to amalgamate them all in one, Cousin, without exhibiting any very definite ideas, merely declares the Infinite to be the primitive, and all that is finite to be derivative from the Infinite, while yet both the Infinite and the finite are so inseparable that neither can exist without the other.——The appellation *Pantheists*, it appears, is unacceptable to Cousin, and to most of his American followers; but some of the latter voluntarily assume it; and they unscrupulously apply it to all Transcendentalists. That the doctrines of the Transcendentalists, as well as those of Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel, are really and truly *pantheistic*, appears from the fact that they all hold to but *one essence*, or *one substance*, in the universe. They expressly deny, that God created or produced the world *out of*

nothing, or that he gave existence to beings and things the substance or matter of which had no previous existence: they say, he created or brought forth the world *from himself*, or formed it out of *his own substance;* and also, that he still exists in the created universe, and the created universe in him, thus constituting an *absolute unity*, as to essence or substance. That the epithet *pantheistic* may properly be applied to such doctrines, seems not to be deniable. [See Krug's Philos. Lexikon; art. *Pantheismus.*]

As Pantheists, the Transcendentalists must behold God, or the divine nature and essence, in every thing that exists. Of course, none of them can ever doubt the *existence of God*, or be in the least danger of atheism; for they cannot believe any thing to exist, without finding God in it: they see him, they feel him, they have sensible perception of his very substance in every object around.——Moreover, if our souls are only portions of the Divinity, if they are really God working in us, then there is solid ground for the belief that *spontaneous Reason* always sees the true nature of things, or has divine knowledge of the objects of its contemplation.——And again, if it is the Divine Nature which lives and acts in all creatures and things, then all *their action* is *Divine action.* All crea-

ted intelligences think, and feel, and act, as God acts in them; and of course, precisely as He would have them. There can, then, be nothing *wrong*, nothing *sinful*, in the character or conduct of any rational being. There may be imperfection, or imperfect action, because the whole power of God is not exerted; but every act, so far as it goes, is just what it should be, just such as best pleases God. And hence, though men may sigh over their imperfections, or may ardently desire and strive to become more perfect, yet they can have no reason for *repentance*, for sorrow and shame and self-condemnation, for any thing they have done or have omitted to do. Neither can they feel themselves to need any radical *change of character*, to make them acceptable to God; or any *Redeemer*, to rescue them from impending perdition. All they need, is, to foster the divinity within, to give it more full scope and more perfect action; then they will become all that it is possible they should be, and all they can reasonably desire.—These inferences from their principles, are not palmed upon Transcendentalists by their adversaries, but are admitted and defended by their ablest writers. Says one of them, whom we have before quoted, [Dial, vol. i. pages 423—4,] "Holding as they do but one essence of all things,

which essence is God, Pantheists must deny the existence of essential evil. All evil is negative, —it is imperfection, non-growth. It is not essential, but modal. Of course there can be no such thing as hereditary sin,—a tendency positively sinful in the soul. Sin is not a wilful transgression of a righteous law, but the difficulty and obstruction which the Infinite meets with in entering into the finite. *Regeneration* is nothing but an ingress of God into the soul, before which sin disappears as darkness before the rising sun. Pantheists hold also to the *atonement*, or at-one-ment between the soul and God. This is strictly a unity or *oneness of essence*, to be brought about by the incarnation of the spirit of God, [in us,] which is going on in us as we grow in holiness. As we grow wise, just, and pure,— in a word, holy,—we grow to be one with him in mode, as we always were in essence. This atonement is effected by *Christ*, only in as far as he taught the manner in which it was to be be accomplished more fully than any other, and gave us a better illustration of the method and result in his own person than any one else that has ever lived."

CHAPTER XVI.

PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH.

Biographical Notice.—His Psychology—Transcendental—Hegelian.—Outline of his Philosophy.—Its bearing on Theology.

The Rev. FREDERIC A. RAUCH, Ph. D., late President of Marshall College, Penn., was born in Hesse Darmstadt, in the year 1806. His father, a pious and orthodox clergyman of the German Reformed Church, is still living, and is an active pastor in the vicinity of Frankfort on the Maine. Dr. Rauch received his education at Marburg, Giessen, and Heidelberg, and became a Professor in the two last named places. In some of his lectures at Heidelberg he uttered his thoughts too freely on the affairs of government, and found it necessary to flee the country. He came to America in 1831. The next year, he took charge of the classical school connected with the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Synod at York, Pennsylvania; and on the removal of that institution to Mercersberg in 1836, he was made President of the College, and Professor of Biblical Literature in the Sem-

inary. He died on the 2d of March, 1841, in the 35th year of his age. (See an Obituary Notice in the New York Observer, March 27, 1841; and the Preliminary Notice to Rauch's Psychology, 2d edition.)

Dr. Rauch was one of that class of German philosophers, who, embracing fully the transcendental speculations of Schelling and Hegel, have labored to reconcile them with the religion of the bible. The two most prominent men of this party in Germany, have been Dr. Philip Marheineke of Berlin, and Dr. Charles Daub of Heidelberg. The former is still living, and is the editor of the Works of Hegel, and also of the Works of Daub, who died in 1836. The biographer of Dr. Rauch characterizes Daub, as being a "giant in the sphere of mind," and "a man who had followed Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, to the farthest bounds of speculation, without surrendering for a moment his firm hold upon the great objects of faith." This metaphysical giant, who travelled the whole round from Kantism to Hegelism, is best known by his mystical work on the nature and origin of Evil, intitled, Judas Iscariot, or Evil in its relation to Good; Heidelb. 1816—18. 8vo. Dr. Rauch was the favorite pupil of Daub; who, it is said, "had fixed his eye upon him as a young man of more than common

promise, who might be expected to do good service in the cause of science, in the department to which he wished to consecrate his life." The doctrines which Daub instilled into the mind of his pupil, Dr. Rauch appears to have brought with him to America, and to have retained as long as he lived.

The first and only publication of Dr. Rauch in this country, was his Psychology, or View of the Human Soul, including Anthropology; first published in 1840, and revised by him for a second edition, 1841. The subject of this work, like that of most German treatises on Psychology, and like the English treatises on Mental Philosophy, is *Empirical* Psychology, not *Rational* or *Speculative* Psychology. That is, it embraces that knowledge of the human Mind, which is derived from *experience* and observation; not that which is obtained by philosophical speculations on the nature and properties of the soul. It therefore has but little to do with *Philosophy* in the proper sense of the term, or with strictly *rational* science. It treats of *empirical* knowledge, not of that which is *scientific*. Still there is a philosophy underlying it, which it is not difficult to discover; and that philosophy is manifestly *transcendental*, and derived from the school of *Hegel*.

Dr. Rauch, being a man of genius, and familiar with the numerous and learned works of the Germans on Psychology, and having access to the more recent investigations of his countrymen in physical science, has been able to embody in his work much that is new and interesting to American readers, especially in the mode of explaining and illustrating the mental phenomena. In the first part of his work entitled Anthropology, he treats largely of *Life*, both in vegetables and animals; of *Instinct*, as a part of animal nature; and of the influence of external Nature on the Mind, and of the Mind on the body. In the second part, or Psychology proper, he treats of *Self-consciousness*, the distinguishing mark of a rational being: and of our two mental faculties, *Reason* and *Will*. Reason in man has three modes of action, *Sensation*, *Intellect*, and *Pure Thinking*. The Will, in the natural or unregenerate man, follows the natural *Desires*, *Inclinations*, *Emotions*, and *Passions*: in the regenerate, it follows the Divine Will. Some concise remarks on true and false *Religion* conclude the work. The short chapter on Pure Thinking, is the only part of the book that directly treats on speculative Philosophy: but philosophical remarks and observations occur throughout the work.

As a philosopher, Dr. Rauch was a *Transcendentalist:* for, he maintains that our Reason gives us *objective knowledge* of things, and not merely *subjective* knowledge. Thus in the department of nature or the material world, he supposes our knowledge to extend beyond *Phenomena*, and to embrace what Kant calls *Noumena.* After describing the Conceptions of the Understanding as being mental *Images* of objects existing in nature, he says, page 227: "The image is *the same* as the thing it represents, . . . the same as the object; for it cannot *be* without it, and, unless it includes what the object includes, it is not its true image. . . . . The image has therefore the *same contents* as the object, with this difference, the one has them as they exist in the mind, *ideally*, the other as they are in the material thing *really.* We would say, therefore, by the power of conceiving, *the contents of an object, and the object itself, become contents of our conceptions* or images." So also, in regard to supersensible objects, or things in the world of thought and of ideas, he supposes we have power to discover their real *essence*, or their ontological nature.— Describing the objects which are the subject matter of Pure Thinking, he says, page 281: "They are wholly *general;* and as such have no existence independent of thinking. Yet they truly

exist; they are not a mere *abstraction;* they are the *pure being* and *nature* of individual things, their *soul* and *life.*" And we shall see, as we proceed, that he undertakes to tell us precisely what is the essential nature of the *human soul* or mind; of *life* also, both in vegetable and animal bodies; and indeed, of all the mysterious *powers* which operate in any part of the created universe.

Being a *Transcendentalist*, Dr. Rauch was diametrically opposed to the views of Kant, whose Critical Philosophy has for its chief aim to overthrow all *Transcendentalism*, or as Kant would rather call it, *Transcendentism.* Kant supposed an impassable gulf to lie between *subjective* and *objective* knowledge in all created things. But Transcendentalists either discover no gulf there, or they suppose they have found out a way to transcend and fairly get over it.

As a Transcendental philosopher, Dr. Rauch belonged to the school of *Hegel*, and not to that of Schelling. For, his whole chapter on Pure Thinking shews that he did not, with Schelling, regard a knowledge of the essential nature of things as attainable by mere *inspection*, or by a *rational intuition;* but, with Hegel, he considered such knowledge as the result of a *logical process*, a *generalization*, or as he denominates it,

Pure Thinking. Thus he writes, page 275:— "Thinking is the true basis of all our knowledge, for until we have penetrated our conceptions by thought, until we know their nature, their ground, their connexion with each other, we have no *science.*" He says also, page 277: "*Thinking* is that activity of mind which *generalizes.* * * * The *generality* here spoken of, is not gained by *abstraction*, but by *position;* it is not the product of *man*, nor of any *object*, it is neither subjective nor objective, but above both; its origin is in pure reason, as such. It exists not merely in our thoughts, but equally as much in nature; it is in the sphere of nature the *genus;* in the sphere of mind the *identity;* and in that of science the *generality.*" In the passage quoted a few paragraphs back, he says of these *generalities:* "They are the *pure being* and *nature* of individual things, their *soul* and *life.*"

According to Dr. Rauch's philosophy, a created *substance* or *thing*, is a mere *activity* or *power* of acting; and not, as is generally supposed, an inscrutable *essence*, with inherent qualities and accidents. Of course, as many kinds of *activity* as exist, so many kinds of *substances* or *things*, are there in the universe. These, it seems, are ascertained to be four in number, viz. (1) *Mind* or soul, an activity that has self-consciousness, intelligence, and will: (2) *Ani-*

mal Life, a plastic power having sensation or feeling, and generating organic bodies, which it nourishes and matures, and then transmits itself through them to a progeny of similar activities; (3) *Vegetable Life*, a plastic power without feeling, which produces organized bodies with roots and leaves, and matures seeds, whereby it propagates itself; and (4) *Lifeless Matter*, which can act only *mechanically*, or by impulse, attraction, repulsion, decomposition, dispersion, combination, aggregation, &c. These four kinds of *activities*, variously combined, and operating upon and with each other, and under various circumstances and conditions, constitute the created universe, and produce all its varied phenomena. Of course, a thorough knowledge of these four activities involves or includes a perfect and scientific knowledge of the entire universe of created beings and things: for, each of these activities is, in the sphere of nature, the *genus* of all the beings and things under it; in the sphere of mind or thought, it is their *identity*; and in the sphere of science or logical arrangement, it is their *generality*, or that which comprehends and embraces them all. If now curiosity enquires, what is the *essential nature* of these all-comprehending activities; Dr. Rauch is prompt to answer, Each of them is a definite *Thought* com-

bined with a *Volition* of God. The infinite Mind conceived them, and the divine fiat made them realities. *Four divine thoughts*, therefore, combined with divine volitions, constitute the entire created universe: and *God* and his *thoughts* are all that exists or has any being.

Some of the passages in Dr. Rauch's Psychology involving such sentiments, here follow. Page 43: "Most of us are in the habit of considering *nature* and its manifold powers as a *mechanical whole*, whose parts have been brought together by some mechanic, and whose *powers exist side by side*, without having any affinity to, or connection with each other. But the opposite of all this is the case. Nature is a *system*, not a conglomeration; *alive* and *active in all its elements and atoms*, it is *filled with powers*, from the *mechanical*, chemical, magnetic, and galvanic, up to *the organic*, *all of which flow invisibly into each other*, *affect and determine each other*. *Eternal laws dwell in them*, and provide that while these powers receive and work with and through each other, none interferes with the other, or in any degree changes its nature, but supports and upholds it. Thus we have *a constant life*, *powers flow up and down*, *to and fro*."——Page 183: "All *life*, wherever it exists, is *formed and organized*. Form is not and cannot be the re-

sult of matter, which is chaotic and shapeless. *Form* in man, and throughout the universe, is the result of *thought*. Hence *life*, being formed, does not proceed from *matter;* but is *a thought of God, accompanied by the divine will*, to be realized in nature, and to appear externally by an organized body. As *the thought* gives the form, so the *divine will, resting in the thought, and inseparably united with it, works as power and law in all nature*. . . . . The *animal*, with its members and senses, what else can it be but *a divine thought* exhibited in an external form ?" Page 184: "The *soul of man* is likewise *a divine thought*, a creation of God, *filled with power to live an existence of its own*."—Page 150: "The *mind* is *pure activity*. . . . . But this activity takes different directions, and unfolds itself in different ways, and thus it may be said to be the *union of manifold activities*, all of which are *internally united*."—Page 195: "The soul contains in its *simple, identical activity, all* that afterwards appears in succession, under the form of *faculties*. They are but the development of the energy of the soul."—Page 256: "*Reason* has not its origin in itself; its author is *God, whose will lives in it as its law*."—Page 185: *Man* is *soul only*, and cannot be any thing else. This soul, however, unfolds itself externally in

the *life of the body*, and internally in the *life of mind*. Twofold in its development, it is one in its origin, and the centre of this union is our personality."—Page 184: "The particles of the body . . . . . are not at all a part of *man;* they are dust, and only their *connection* and the *life* connecting them, is truly human."—Page 283: "That which truly *is* in nature, are the *divine thoughts*, the *divine laws:* and all the rest is but matter."—Page 191: "It is not nature nor matter that produces personality, but *God*, who is the *ground of all personality*. We can know a thing thoroughly only when we are acquainted with *its ground*—so *man must know God before he can become truly acquainted with himself.*"

In his Preface, page iv., Dr. Rauch tells us that one great object which he aimed to accomplish, was, "to give the science of man a direct bearing upon the other sciences, and *especially upon religion and theology.*" And it must be admitted that he every where manifests profound reverence for God, and a deep sense of the importance of religion. But whether his philosophy is favorable to sound views of religion, deserves more examination than comports with the design of these sketches. If I have not entirely misunderstood him, he is a *Transcendentalist* and a *Pantheist* of the school of *Hegel*. It is

also noticeable that his book makes no allusion to any *special Revelation* from God, or to an *apostasy* of man, the intervention of a *Savior*, the *forgiveness of sin* in consequence of an *atonement*, a future *judgment*, and eternal *retributions* after the present life. At the same time, his pantheistic, transcendental principles seem to leave little or no room for these cardinal doctrines of the Bible; which are either discarded, or essentially changed, by all German, as well as American Transcendentalists. He utterly denies the *freedom of the Will* in the natural man; and he gives to the *divine Will* an absolute control over the *human*, in the regenerate. See page 155, &c., 292, &c., 309—He affirms that, by nature, or in his natural state, man is wholly *incapable of holiness*. See pages 383, 398.—He explicitly says: "Religion is not a mere *quality*, but *the substance* of man. . . . . He ceases to be *man*, in the full sense of the term, when he has no religion." See Pref. page iv.—He defines *true religion* to be, "*a peculiar activity of God*, which, announcing itself to the *heart* of man, changes it, converts it, and restores man to peace with himself, with the world, and with God." See page 388. He thus explicitly admits a *regeneration of the soul by the power of God;* but he makes it to be a change of man's *substance* or

nature; a change too, which seems to constitute the whole of man's *redemption*, or to leave no room for the *pardon of sin* through an atonement, and no work for a *Mediator* between God and man. The simple *activity of God upon the heart, accomplishes the whole business.* Inshort, like other Trancendentalists, he seems to make *religion* in man, to be *an operation of God, carrying out and perfecting the Creation of a rational soul.*

ERRATA.

Page	17, l.	24, for encyclopedists r. encyclopædists.
	18 and 20,	Running Title, for IMPERIAL r. EMPIRICAL.
	24,	10, for cannot be, r. can be.
	48,	5, for No. I. r. Chap. I.
	64,	26, after knowledge, insert a comma.
	83,	15, for number r. chapter.
	93,	3, for thus it r. then it.
	95,	20, for powers r. process.
	106,	18, for all changes r. all the changes.
	112,	14, for of philosophy r. of his philosophy.
	"	23, for the acts r. these acts.
	114,	bottom line, for Stutgard r. Stuttgard.
	126,	8, insert a) after 1832.
	"	26, for Chris r. Christ.
	140,	8, after who, insert a comma.
	141,	13, after ideas, insert a comma.
	146,	18, for 1804 r. 1840.
	"	26, r. charge d'affaires.
	148,	5, for Lonis read Louis.
	"	18, for Azias r. Azais.
	149,	11, for common sense r. common name.
	150,	13, for 1833 r. 1832.
	160,	26, for Number r. Chapter.
	163,	7, after nature, insert a comma.
	"	9, after It is, omit comma.
	165,	3, for happiness r. well-being.
	176,	3, for expressions r. expression.

[For want of suitable type the omission of the accents in German, Greek and French words must remain without correction.—*Printer.*

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY,
BERKELEY

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW

Books not returned on time are subject to a fine of 50c per volume after the third day overdue, increasing to $1.00 per volume after the sixth day. Books not in demand may be renewed if application is made before expiration of loan period.

MAY 4 1925

SEP 17 1980

MAR 30 1926

MAR 06 1970 23

REC'D LD MAY 28 70 -4 PM

REC. CIR. JUN 21 '77

Lurdock
Modern philosophy
JUN 9 1921 Stonehead
MAY 4 1925 Lapsley
R 30 1926 Kahn
AUG 5 1927 Muirhead
MAR17 1980 P.E. Schuenemann
M8
APR 23 1925
APR 2 1926
NOV 1927
MAR 24, 1980
2547 2
B791
M8
BRARY